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 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The urge to understand human behavior is perhaps the main reason why 
so many are attracted to the psychological sciences. One does not need to look 
far, however, to come up with a possible determinant of behavior. The simple 
evaluation of a stimulus, for instance, seems to be one of the major causes of 
behavior towards it (e.g., Allport, 1935; Martin & Levy, 1978). To give but one 
example: we tend to seek contact with the people we like while we tend to avoid 
those we dislike. Given the widespread influence that evaluation has on behav-
ior, many influential researchers have proposed that the evaluation of a stimulus 
can take place in an unconditional, automatic fashion (e.g., Arnold, 1960; 
Bartlett, 1932; Lazarus, 1966; Wundt, 1907). However, it wasn’t until the 1980’s, 
after Zajonc published his seminal papers on the primacy of affect, that the auto-
matic stimulus evaluation hypothesis was subjected to a systematic experimental 
analysis (Zajonc, 1980, 1984). 
Many studies indeed found indices of unconditional, automatic stimulus 
evaluation. Stimulus evaluation emerged as a fast process (e.g. Hermans, De 
Houwer, & Eelen, 2001) that is independent of cognitive resources (e.g. 
Hermans, Crombez, & Eelen, 2001), conscious awareness (e.g. Draine & 
Greenwald, 1998), or current goals and task demands (e.g. Bargh, Chaiken, 
Raymond, & Hymes, 1996). Support for the automatic evaluation hypothesis has 
grown steadily over the past decades in both the behavioral sciences (e.g. Fazio, 
2001) and the affective neurosciences (e.g. Vuilleumier, 2005). Nevertheless, 
effects of automatic stimulus evaluation have not always emerged consistently in 
several studies (e.g. Klauer & Musch, 2001; Pessoa, 2005). If automatic stimulus 
evaluation is a truly unconditional, automatic process, its effects should be found 
more readily. Within our lab, we therefore proposed an account that puts auto-
matic evaluation in a new perspective and stresses the crucial role of feature-
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specific attention allocation (Spruyt, De Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 2012; 
Spruyt De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009; Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 
2007). Automatic stimulus evaluation seems to depend crucially on whether or 
not affective stimulus information is selectively attended to. 
In this chapter, I will first review the evidence corroborating the hypothesis 
that affective stimulus processing can occur in an unconditional and automatic 
fashion. Next, I will discuss several findings that are inconsistent with this point 
of view and will present a new framework that can reconcile these inconsistent 
findings. The chapter closes with a summary of several predictions following this 
framework and how they were systematically tested over the course of the pro-
ject. 
UNCONDITIONAL, AUTOMATIC AFFECTIVE STIMULUS PROCESSING 
To study affective stimulus processing, experimental paradigms are needed 
that allow one to measure it. Unfortunately, stimulus evaluation cannot be ob-
served directly. It can only be studied by examining its impact on behavior 
and/or neural activity. 
In the behavioral sciences, the affective priming paradigm is perhaps the 
most acclaimed paradigm that allows for the measurement of affective stimulus 
processing (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; see Klauer & Musch, 
2003, for a review). In this paradigm, participants are usually asked to categorize 
affectively polarized target stimuli as either “good” or “bad” (i.e. the affective 
categorization task). Each target stimulus is preceded by the short presentation 
of an affectively polarized “prime” stimulus that is irrelevant to the task at hand. 
Performance is generally better when the prime and the target belong to the 
same affective category (e.g., the words “sunshine” and “kitten”) than when they 
do not (e.g., the words “sunshine” and “rapist”). This effect can occur only if the 
affective value of the prime has been processed and thus serves as a marker for 
the affective processing of the prime stimulus. Aside from the affective priming 
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paradigm, a host of other paradigms have been developed that tap into auto-
matic affective stimulus processing as well. In the affective Simon paradigm (De 
Houwer & Eelen, 1998), for instance, participants are asked to categorize affec-
tively polarized words as either nouns or adjectives with affectively polarized 
response labels (‘positive’ and ‘negative’). Even though affective valence is com-
pletely irrelevant to the task at hand, performance is usually better when the 
affective valence of the words matches with the affective valence of the re-
sponse label (e.g. ‘baby’ and ‘positive’) than when they do not (e.g. ‘friend’ and 
‘negative’). 
In the neurosciences, two approaches in the measurement of affective 
stimulus processing can be distinguished. First, neuro-imaging techniques can be 
used to measure activity in brain regions involved in affective stimulus pro-
cessing. The amygdala is such a brain structure that has consistently been shown 
to play a key role in the processing of affective stimuli (LeDoux, 2000; Phelps & 
LeDoux, 2005; Vuilleumier, 2005). Second, EEG recordings can be used to 
measure effects of affective stimulus processing on various ERP components 
related to stimulus processing. The presentation of affective stimuli has been 
shown to influence components as early as the P1, which occurs roughly 100 ms 
after stimulus presentation (Smith, Cacioppo, Larsen, & Chartrand, 2003). In fact, 
nearly every ERP component further down the EEG signal chain appears to be 
modulated by stimulus affectivity to some extent as well (Carretié, Hinojosa, 
Martin-Loeches, Mercado, & Tapia, 2004; Olofsson, Nordin, Sequiera, & Polich, 
2008). For instance, the P3a, a component related to automatic orienting to-
wards novel stimuli (Polich, 2007), has proven to be especially sensitive to emo-
tional changes in stimuli (Campanella et al., 2002). Moreover, Schupp, Junghöfer, 
Weike, and Hamm (2003) demonstrated that affective stimuli evoke an early 
negative deflection in the EEG signal at posterior sites (early posterior 
negativity), followed by a slow positive wave at parietal sites (late positive poten-
tial). Both components are thought to be related to affective modulation of 
lower and higher stages of stimulus processing respectively (for a review, see 
Schupp, Flaisch, Stockburger, & Junghofer, 2006). 
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In both domains, affective stimulus processing has been shown to be pro-
cessed automatically. Automaticity is best considered an umbrella term that 
holds several independent features (for a review on automaticity, see Moors & 
De Houwer, 2006). A first feature is related to the speed of the process under 
study: A process can be automatic in the sense of being fast. A second feature is 
related to the need for cognitive resources. A process can be automatic in the 
sense of needing little cognitive resources, thus being efficient. A third feature is 
related to the awareness of the stimulus and the subsequent processing of the 
stimulus. A process can be automatic when it occurs outside of the awareness of 
the instigating stimulus and the process under study. A fourth feature pertains to 
a process being automatic in the sense of occurring independent of the current 
goals of a person. This is by no means an exhaustive list of all possible automa-
ticity features mentioned in the literature. The current list does, however, pro-
vide sufficient coverage for the present purposes. 
In affective priming studies, the presence of these features became 
apparent through the persistence of the affective priming effect under condi-
tions that impede stimulus processing. Hermans, De Houwer, et al. (2001) con-
cluded affective stimulus processing is fast because affective priming effects are 
largest when the time interval between the onset of the prime and the onset of 
the target is very short (merely 150 ms). The efficiency of affective stimulus pro-
cessing was demonstrated by Hermans, Crombez, et al. (2001), who asked 
participants to simultaneously perform an effortful secondary task. Affective 
priming effects reliably emerged even though the secondary task required ample 
cognitive capacity. If anything, affective priming effects are even larger when 
cognitive resources are depleted (Klauer & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007). Also, Draine 
and Greenwald (1998; Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996) showed that affec-
tive priming effects come about even when the primes are presented below indi-
vidual recognition thresholds. Affective stimulus processing can thus occur out-
side of awareness of the instigating stimulus as well. One further automaticity 
feature became apparent when Hermans et al. (1994) and Bargh et al. (1996) 
used the naming task instead of the affective categorization task. In contrast with 
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the affective categorization task, the naming task does not require one to 
evaluate the target stimuli but to merely name them. Even under the absence of 
such an explicit evaluative processing goal, affective priming effects reliably 
emerged. These findings suggest that affective stimulus processing can even be 
independent of an evaluative processing goal. 
In a similar fashion, the presence of automaticity features was deduced 
from neurophysiological research on affective stimulus processing. Here too, 
affective stimulus processing emerged as a fast process, with stimulus affectivity 
modulating the EEG signal as early as 100 ms after stimulus presentation (e.g. 
Carretié et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2003). The efficiency of affective stimulus pro-
cessing was demonstrated by studies showing neural effects of affective stimula-
tion even when participants concurrently performed a secondary task that taxed 
cognitive resources to a significant extent (e.g. Hajcak, Dunning, & Foti, 2007). 
Furthermore, affective stimuli were found to modulate neural activity even when 
they were presented outside the focus of attention (Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, 
De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001) or below 
awareness thresholds (Kiss & Eimer, 2008; Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1998; 
Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Whalen et al., 1998). Finally, many such studies suggest 
that affective stimulus processing can also occur when no evaluative processing 
goal is present. For instance, affective modulation of neural activity has been 
found when participants were asked to merely look at affective stimuli (Schupp 
et al. 2004) or when they performed a non-emotional task (Schupp et al., 2003; 
Vuilleumier et al., 2001). 
In sum, a myriad of studies has shown affective stimulus processing to 
possess automaticity-defining features. Furthermore, the wide range of condi-
tions under which effects of affective stimulus processing are found suggest af-
fective stimulus processing occurs in a truly unconditional fashion. 
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INCONSISTENT FINDINGS 
Although the paragraph above paints a picture of a solid, unequivocal phe-
nomenon, several studies produced inconsistent results. More specifically, while 
many studies suggested that affective stimulus processing can be characterized 
as an automatic, unconditional phenomenon, it must be emphasized that the 
effect failed to emerge in a substantial amount of studies too. 
Consider, for instance, affective priming of naming responses. This effect 
initially showed that affective stimulus processing can occur even when an (ex-
plicit) evaluative processing goal is absent (Bargh et al., 1996; Hermans et al., 
1994). Several researchers later reported that they were unable to replicate this 
effect. Klauer and Musch (2001) failed to find affective priming of naming re-
sponses in a series of four statistically powerful experiments. Affective priming of 
naming responses failed to emerge regardless of the size of the stimulus set 
(Experiment 1), the time interval between prime onset and target onset 
(Experiment 2), the similarity of the procedure to the original Bargh et al. (1996) 
study (Experiment 3), or the language in which the study was conducted 
(Experiment 4). Likewise, Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere, De Houwer, and Eelen 
(2004), failed to observe affective priming of naming responses with a nearly 
exact replication of Bargh et al.’s (1996) study. 
Further research eventually pointed out that affective priming of naming 
responses comes about only under certain preconditions. One such precondition 
that reliably emerged in several studies is semantic stimulus processing. As the 
semantic system contains affective stimulus information (e.g. Bower, 1991), a 
semantic analysis might be a necessary prerequisite for automatic affective stim-
ulus processing to occur. De Houwer, Hermans, and Spruyt (2001), for instance, 
boosted semantic stimulus processing in the naming task by visually degrading 
the target words. Pronouncing a word can come about through a direct transla-
tion from orthography to phonology, without any involvement of the semantic 
system. Visually degrading a word hampers this direct translation and allows for 
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more semantic involvement. Consistent with their hypothesis, affective priming 
of naming responses was found only when the target words were visually de-
graded. In another study, De Houwer and Randell (2004) made naming condi-
tional on a semantic attribute of the target word, making semantic stimulus pro-
cessing necessary to correctly perform the task. Again, affective priming of 
naming responses was found only under these conditions. Another way semantic 
involvement can be guaranteed is through the use of pictures instead of words, 
as pictures have privileged access to the semantic system (Glaser, 1992; Glaser 
and Glaser, 1989). Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, and Eelen (2002) indeed found 
the size of affective priming of naming responses to depend on the modality of 
the stimuli. 
Another precondition is selective attention towards affective stimulus in-
formation, which will be discussed extensively in the next section (Spruyt et al., 
2007, 2009, 2012). Given these findings, one can hardly advocate that automatic 
affective stimulus processing occurs in an unconditional fashion. After all, an un-
conditional process by definition does not rely on preconditions to occur. 
Similar observations have been made in the affective neurosciences (for a 
review, see Pessoa, 2005). In contrast with earlier studies (e.g. Vuilleumier et al., 
2001), affective stimuli have shown not to increase amygdala activity (Lange et 
al., 2003; Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002; Pessoa, Padmala, & 
Morland, 2005; Silvert et al., 2007) or modulate the EEG signal (Doallo, Rodriguez 
Holguin, & Cadaveira, 2006) in several instances. Pessoa (2005) put forward that 
authors might have used excessively lenient criteria to assess whether affective 
stimulus processing is independent of cognitive resources or awareness (e.g. 
Pessoa, Japee, and Ungerleider, 2005). Many researchers who employed 
sufficiently rigorous testing conditions did not find effects of affective stimulus 
processing. These strict testing criteria include: presenting the affective stimuli 
outside the focus of attention, using a non-emotional task to ensure the absence 
of an evaluative processing goal, and employing a sufficiently difficult task to 
deplete cognitive resources. 
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To sum up, the claim that affective stimulus processing proceeds in an un-
conditional, automatic fashion seems equivocal at best. Effects of automatic 
affective stimulus processing are not consistently found over different studies 
and the alleged unconditionality of automatic affective stimulus processing is 
therefore challenged. 
FEATURE-SPECIFIC ATTENTION ALLOCATION AS A NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR 
AUTOMATIC AFFECTIVE STIMULUS PROCESSING 
Recently, a new framework was developed at our lab that allows one to 
reconcile these inconsistencies (Spruyt, 2005; Spruyt et al., 2007, 2009, 2012). 
According to this framework, automatic affective stimulus processing is modu-
lated by feature-specific attention allocation. More specifically, automatic 
affective stimulus processing is thought to occur only if and to the extent that 
affective stimulus information is selectively attended to. Conversely, when selec-
tive attention is directed to non-affective semantic stimulus information, en-
hanced processing of this kind of stimulus information is expected to occur. 
Spruyt et al. (2009) demonstrated the viability of this framework with 
several affective priming studies. In one seminal study, participants were pre-
sented with the affective priming paradigm. In 25% of all trials, participants per-
formed the naming task on the target stimuli. In the remaining 75% of all trials, 
one group of participants performed an affective categorization task while 
another group of participants performed a non-affective semantic categorization 
task (i.e., categorize the target stimuli as either animals or objects). Conse-
quently, the former group of participants (the affective group) was encouraged 
to attend selectively to affective stimulus information whereas the latter group 
of participants (the non-affective group) was encouraged to attend selectively to 
semantic non-affective stimulus information. These categorization trials will 
henceforth be called induction trials because they serve as tools to encourage 
participants to attend selectively to particular kinds of stimulus information. In 
accordance with the framework of feature-specific attention allocation, affective 
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priming of naming responses was found only in the affective group. Conversely, 
in the non-affective group, the only priming effect that was found was a seman-
tic category priming effect regarding the animal and object categories the par-
ticipants were encouraged to attend to. Spruyt et al. (2007, 2009, 2012) 
consistently found this modulation effect in five different experiments. 
Furthermore, these effects occurred even when affective primes were presented 
subliminally, showing that feature-specific attention allocation modulates auto-
matic affective stimulus processing both at the conscious and the unconscious 
level (Spruyt et al., 2012). 
The framework of feature-specific attention allocation can be 
conceptualized by representing stimuli in a multidimensional space of which the 
various dimensions correspond to different stimulus features (e.g. Figure 1). 
Feature-specific attention allocation acts on this space by stretching those di-
mensions that are selectively attended to and shrinking those that aren’t 
(Shepard, 1964; Nosofsky, 1986). As a result, differences along the dimensions 
that receive selective attention become more apparent and easier to process. 
However, differences along dimensions that are  not attended to become less 
salient and get processed to a lesser extent. This principle is illustrated in Figure 
1 with stimuli that were used in the studies of Spruyt et al. (2007). 
This multidimensional conceptualization also demonstrates the generality 
of the framework. Feature-specific attention allocation is thought to influence 
affective and non-affective stimulus dimensions alike. Furthermore, the frame-
work is not only relevant for semantic stimulus dimensions, but is also applicable 
to lower-level, perceptual stimulus dimensions. Nosofsky (1986), for instance, 
applied this principle to the categorization of perceptual stimuli. He asked par-
ticipants to categorize stimuli according to different perceptual features to en-
courage them to attend selectively to those features. Afterwards, a multi-
dimensional scaling algorithm was applied to the categorization responses to 
reconstruct the underlying multidimensional space. In line with the framework of 
feature-specific attention allocation, the resulting solution showed that a greater 
weight was applied to those stimulus dimensions that were attended to. 
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Figure 1. Hypothetical example of the multidimensional conceptualization of 
feature-specific attention allocation. The images represent multidimensional 
spaces with figures that were used as stimuli in Spruyt et al. (2007). The horizon-
tal axes reflect the affective stimulus dimensions whereas the vertical axes reflect 
animacy dimensions. Panel a shows the multidimensional representation without 
effects of feature-specific attention allocation. Panel b shows effects of selective 
attention towards the affective stimulus dimension. Panel c shows effects of se-
lective attention towards the animacy dimension. 
Nosofsky’s (1986) studies are also in line with several neuroscientific 
findings that show that selective attention to perceptual features modulates 
neural responses. Single-cell recording studies (see Maunsell & Treue, 2006, for a 
a) 
b) c) 
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review) and brain imaging studies (e.g. Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & 
Peterson, 1990; Saenz, Buracas, & Boynton, 2002; Serences & Boynton, 2007) 
have shown neurons in the visual cortex to be more sensitive to stimuli contain-
ing a perceptual feature that is attended to, even when the receptive fields of 
these neurons lie in a location that is not attended to. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCOUNT OF FEATURE-SPECIFIC ATTENTION ALLOCATION: 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
While Spruyt et al. (2009) provided convincing empirical evidence for the 
general hypothesis that automatic affective stimulus processing depends on 
feature-specific attention allocation, several crucial implications of this 
hypothesis remain untested. The aim of the present project is to systematically 
test these implications in order to further corroborate the framework of feature-
specific attention allocation and facilitate practical applications of the framework 
in the future. 
Subtle procedural aspects induce feature-specific attention allocation 
The feature-specific attention allocation account states that automatic af-
fective stimulus processing of task-irrelevant stimuli will occur only when selec-
tive attention is directed to the affective stimulus dimension. Put differently, this 
strong claim implies that affective stimulus information must have been 
attended to if effects of automatic affective stimulus processing are observed. 
Yet, many indications of automatic affective stimulus processing have been 
found without explicit manipulations of feature-specific attention allocation. 
Nevertheless, it could be hypothesized that these studies employed procedures 
that implicitly encouraged participants to attend to affective stimulus infor-
mation. Such aspects of the procedure possibly include the wording of the in-
structions, the content of the informed consent form, the participant’s 
knowledge of the lab’s research interests, or the use of extremely affective stim-
ulus sets. 
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In Chapter 1, we examined whether one of these aspects, namely the bla-
tant use of affectively polarized stimuli, affects feature-specific attention alloca-
tion and automatic affective stimulus processing. More specifically, we pre-
sented participants with an affective priming paradigm in which the naming task 
was used. One fourth of all trials consisted of regular affective priming trials. 
These ‘experimental’ trials were presented together with ‘filler’ trials that con-
tained affectively polarized stimuli in one group of participants (the affective 
group) and affectively neutral stimuli in another group of participants (the non-
affective group). We hypothesized that the blatant use of affective stimuli in the 
affective group would encourage participants to selectively attend to affective 
stimulus information. As a result, automatic affective stimulus processing was 
predicted to occur in this group, leading to affective priming of naming re-
sponses. In the non-affective group, we expected no such effects because affec-
tive stimuli were not obviously present throughout the experiment. 
Feature-specific attention allocation affects consequences of affective stimulus 
processing 
Feature-specific attention allocation has, up till now, only been demon-
strated to affect automatic affective stimulus processing as measured with the 
affective priming task (Spruyt et al. 2007, 2009, 2012). In this task, automatic 
affective stimulus processing is measured through some of its consequences, 
such as response conflict (De Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002) 
or facilitation of stimulus encoding (Spruyt et al., 2007). As feature-specific atten-
tion allocation affects automatic affective stimulus processing  per se, one can 
assume that it affects other consequences of automatic affective stimulus pro-
cessing as well. 
In Chapter 2, we investigated whether selective attention towards affective 
stimulus information impacts one such a consequence, namely attentional bias 
to negative stimuli. This particular consequence of affective stimulus processing 
reflects the power of negative stimuli to draw attention and disrupt performance 
(for a review, see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van 
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IJzendoorn, 2007). In two experiments, we used two different measures of atten-
tional bias while manipulating feature-specific attention allocation. Induction 
trials were used to manipulate feature-specific attention allocation, much like 
the manipulation employed by Spruyt et al. (2009). Participants were encour-
aged to attend to either affective stimulus information or to a non-affective type 
of stimulus information, namely whether or not the stimulus denoted a human 
being or not. Attentional bias was measured using the emotional Stroop task in 
Experiment 1 and the dot probe task in Experiment 2. In the emotional Stroop 
task (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), participants are asked to name the 
colors of sequentially presented words. Task performance is usually worse when 
the word holds a negative rather than a neutral meaning. This effect is thought 
to reflect the negative content of the word drawing attention away from the task 
goals. In the dot probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), participants are 
asked to respond to the location of sequentially presented dot probes on the 
screen. Each dot probe presentation is preceded by the presentation of a neutral 
and a negative picture in two different locations on the screen. Task perfor-
mance is usually better when the dot probe is presented on the location in which 
a negative picture was presented previously rather than when the dot probe is 
presented on the location in which a neutral picture was presented previously. 
This effect is thought to reflect the negative picture drawing attention to its loca-
tion and consequently affecting the localizing of the dot probe. Attentional bias 
towards negative stimuli was expected to occur only when feature-specific atten-
tion was directed to affective stimulus information. In contrast, when 
participants were encouraged to attend to stimulus information necessary for 
the discrimination of humans from non-humans, an attentional bias towards 
stimuli that denoted humans was expected. 
In Chapter 3, the impact of feature-specific attention allocation on 
another, neural manifestation of attentional bias was examined. When a set of 
stimuli is presented sequentially in a predictable fashion, the occurrence of an 
unpredictable stimulus in this sequence captures attention, which can be 
measured using electrophysiological recordings (EEG). The P3a is an ERP compo-
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nent that reflects this attentional capture (e.g. Polich, 2007) and has been shown 
to be larger when the unpredictable stimulus differs from the predictable stimuli 
in its affective value than when it does not (Campanella et al., 2002). In one EEG 
study, we aimed to show that this effect of affective, unpredictable stimuli on 
P3a size is also modulated by feature-specific attention allocation. To demon-
strate this, we presented participants with sequences of neutral faces in which 
rare, unpredictable faces were presented that could differ from the predictable 
faces with respect to either the emotion they display or the age they have. One 
group of participants was encouraged to attend to the affective value of the pre-
sented stimulus faces, while another group of participants was encouraged to 
attend to the age of the faces. We expected the size of the P3a to be contingent 
on the feature that was selectively attended to. When the unpredictable face 
deviated from the predictable faces with respect to the emotion it displayed, a 
significant P3a component was expected only when participants attended to 
emotional, affective stimulus information. When the unpredictable face deviated 
from the predictable faces with respect to the age it portrayed, a significant P3a 
component was expected only when participants attended to age-related stim-
ulus information. 
Feature-specific attention allocation can be measured using multidimensional 
scaling 
As mentioned above, modulation of feature-specific attention allocation 
can be conceptualized by representing stimuli in a psychological, multi-
dimensional space. The dimensions of this space correspond to the various stim-
ulus features on which the stimuli can vary (e.g. age, emotion, color, …). Feature-
specific attention allocation selectively stretches those stimulus dimensions that 
are attended to while it shrinks those that are not. As a result, differences along 
the dimensions that are attended to become more apparent and easier to pro-
cess, while the opposite occurs for stimulus dimensions that are not attended to. 
Several multidimensional scaling techniques have been developed that allow for 
the visualization of this psychological space and the effects of feature-specific 
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attention allocation on it (Carroll & Chang, 1970; Commandeur & Heiser, 1993; 
Young, 1982). 
In Chapter 4, we used such a multidimensional scaling technique to 
measure the degree to which different stimulus dimensions are attended to. In 
future studies, we would aim to use such measures as a manipulation check and 
to test whether automatic affective stimulus processing is linearly dependent on 
feature-specific attention allocation. We therefore set out to test whether multi-
dimensional scaling algorithms could be a valuable tool for the measurement of 
feature-specific attention allocation. We employed Spruyt et al.’s (2009) 
manipulation of feature-specific attention allocation and used a multi-
dimensional scaling technique (INDSCAL; Carroll & Chang, 1970) to model the 
subjects’ psychological space. In accordance with earlier studies, we expected 
the selective stretching of the participants’ psychological spaces to coincide with 
those stimulus dimensions they were encouraged to attend to, regardless of 
whether the stimulus dimension was affective or not. 
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ON THE (UN)CONDITIONALITY OF AUTOMATIC 
ATTITUDE ACTIVATION:  
THE VALENCE PROPORTION EFFECT 1 
   
 
Affective priming studies have shown that participants are faster to pronounce 
affectively polarized target words that are preceded by affectively congruent 
prime words than affectively polarized target words that are preceded by affec-
tively incongruent prime words. We examined whether affective priming of 
naming responses depends on the valence proportion (i.e. the proportion of stim-
uli that are affectively polarized). In one group of participants, experimental trials 
were embedded in a context of filler trials that consisted of affectively polarized 
stimulus materials (i.e., high valence proportion condition). In a second group, the 
same set of experimental trials was embedded in a context of filler trials 
consisting of neutral stimuli (i.e., low valence proportion condition). Results 
showed that affective priming of naming responses was significantly stronger in 
the high valence proportion condition than in the low valence proportion condi-
tion. We conclude that (a) subtle aspects of the procedure can influence affective 
priming of naming responses, (b) finding affective priming of naming responses 
does not allow for the conclusion that affective processing is unconditional, and 
(c) affective stimulus processing depends on selective attention for affective 
stimulus information. 
                                                     
1
 Based on Everaert, T., Spruyt, A., & De Houwer, J. (2012). On the 
(un)conditionality of automatic attitude activation: The valence proportion 
effect. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65, 125-132. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the history of psychology, researchers have advocated the idea 
that humans are equipped with a mechanism capable of automatically evaluating 
the affective value of all incoming stimulus information (e.g., Arnold, 1960; 
Bartlett, 1932; Lazarus, 1966; Wundt, 1907; Zajonc, 1980, 1984). One paradigm 
often used to study automatic stimulus evaluation is the affective priming para-
digm (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). In a typical affective priming 
study, participants are asked to evaluate several affectively polarized target 
stimuli as positive or negative as fast as possible (i.e. the evaluative categoriza-
tion task). Each of these targets is preceded by an affective prime stimulus. 
Typically, it is observed that performance is faster and more accurate when 
prime and target are affectively congruent (e.g., ‘HAPPY’ – ‘KITTEN’) than when 
they are affectively incongruent (e.g., ‘TENDER’ – ‘PEDOPHILE’), a phenomenon 
referred to as the affective priming effect (for reviews, see De Houwer, Teige-
Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009; Fazio, 2001; Klauer & Musch, 2003). Cru-
cially, such an effect can occur only if the affective meaning of the prime has 
been processed. Therefore, the affective priming effect can be conceived of as a 
cognitive marker of affective stimulus processing. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that stimulus evaluation occurs in an un-
conditional, automatic fashion, the affective priming effect has proven to be a 
rather robust phenomenon. For instance, affective priming effects have been 
obtained while participants performed an effortful secondary task (Hermans, 
Crombez, & Eelen, 2000; also see Klauer & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007) and when 
using short stimulus onset asynchronies (Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001), 
subliminal prime presentations (Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Greenwald, Draine, 
& Abrams, 1996), and stimuli from different modalities (Hermans, Baeyens, & 
Eelen, 1998; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1994; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, 
& Eelen, 2002). 
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Also, whereas most affective priming studies employed the evaluative 
categorization task (see above), both Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, and Hymes 
(1996) and Hermans, De Houwer, and Eelen (1994) obtained significant affective 
priming effects using a word naming task. Unlike the evaluative categorization 
task, the naming task does not require participants to adopt an explicit 
evaluative processing goal. The findings of Bargh et al. and Hermans et al. 
therefore suggest that affective stimulus processing does not depend on the ac-
tivation of an explicit evaluative processing mindset. 
Evidence concerning the reliability of the affective priming effect in the 
naming task is mixed however. Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere, De Houwer, and 
Eelen (2004), for example, were unsuccessful in obtaining the effect in a nearly 
exact replication of Bargh et al.’s (1996) Experiment 2. Likewise, Klauer and 
Musch (2001) failed to replicate this effect in a series of four statistically power-
ful experiments (see also, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998). In contrast, 
Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, and Eelen (2002) demonstrated that affective 
priming of naming responses can be readily obtained when pictures are used as 
primes and targets but not when words are used as primes and targets (see also 
Wentura & Frings, 2008). 
To explain these inconsistent findings, De Houwer and Randell (2004; also 
see De Houwer, Hermans, & Spruyt, 2001) suggested that affective priming of 
naming responses depends on the extent to which naming is semantically medi-
ated. Because affective stimulus information is stored within the semantic sys-
tem (e.g., Bower, 1991), one can indeed expect that affective stimulus processing 
is more likely to take place when an in-depth semantic analysis of the target 
stimuli is required. In line with this hypothesis, De Houwer and Randell obtained 
reliable affective priming of naming responses when participants were asked to 
name only those target words that did not belong to a specific semantic category 
(Experiment 2). In contrast, when the naming of the targets was conditional 
upon the color of the word rather than its semantic category, no affective prim-
ing was obtained (Experiment 1). Also consistent with the idea that affective 
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priming of naming responses depends on the extent of in-depth semantic pro-
cessing is the observation that affective priming in the naming task is typically 
more robust and replicable when pictures instead of words are used as primes 
and targets (Spruyt et al., 2002). Pictures are known to have privileged access to 
the semantic system (Glaser, 1992; Glaser and Glaser, 1989). Pictorial primes will 
therefore activate affective stimulus information to a higher degree than do 
words. Moreover, because pictures first have to activate their concept nodes 
within the semantic system before they can be named (Glaser, 1992; Glaser and 
Glaser, 1989), picture naming is always semantically mediated. 
Recent studies conducted by Spruyt, De Houwer, and Hermans (2009; also 
see Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007) suggest an alternative, more 
fine-grained interpretation, however. Spruyt et al. put forward that automatic 
semantic stimulus processing is modulated by feature-specific attention alloca-
tion. More specifically, they argued that the semantic analysis of a task-irrelevant 
stimulus is more pronounced for those stimulus dimensions that are selectively 
attended to. Given the assumption that affect can be regarded as a semantic 
dimension (e.g., Bower, 1991; De Houwer & Hermans, 1994; Fiske & Pavelchak, 
1986), the hypothesis of Spruyt et al. thus implies that automatic affective pro-
cessing of task-irrelevant stimuli will depend on the extent to which affective 
stimulus information is selectively attended to.1 
                                                     
1 Following the guidelines of Moors and De Houwer (2006), we adhere to a 
feature-based, decompositional approach to the definition and diagnosis of 
automaticity. According to this viewpoint, different automaticity features can be 
conceptually and logically separated and should therefore be studied 
independently from each other. It thus makes little sense to classify a process as 
non-automatic simply because it is found to depend on a particular (set of) 
precondition(s). Accordingly, the hypothesis that affective priming of naming 
responses depends on feature-specific attention allocation does not imply that 
affective processing is a non-automatic processes. 
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Spruyt et al. (2009), for instance, manipulated the degree to which atten-
tion was assigned to the affective stimulus dimension by asking participants to 
classify the targets on the basis of their affective connotation on either 25% or 
75% of all trials (Experiment 1). Consistent with the selective-attention frame-
work, affective priming of naming responses was significantly stronger in the 75 
% evaluation condition than in the 25% evaluation condition. 
Based on these findings, one could argue that the affective stimulus di-
mension was selectively attended to in prior studies that did produce affective 
priming of naming responses (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Hermans et al., 1994). Con-
sider, for example, the findings of De Houwer and Randell (2004). A closer look at 
their procedures reveals that it may have been an efficient strategy for partici-
pants to selectively assign attention to affective stimulus information. In both 
studies, all to-be-named words had a clear affective connotation (e.g., ‘TERRIFIC’) 
whereas all to-be-ignored targets were affectively neutral. In other words, stim-
ulus valence was informative about whether a naming response was required or 
not. This subtle procedural feature may have encouraged participants to adopt a 
strategic evaluative processing goal (but see Pecchinenda, Ganteaume, & Banse, 
2006). 
Feature-specific attention allocation may also have been responsible for 
the findings obtained with the picture – picture naming task (Spruyt et al, 2002; 
Wentura & Frings, 2008). Spruyt et al. showed that pictures are more effective as 
primes and more susceptible to priming as targets. In their studies, however, 
there might have been a confound between stimulus modality and the degree to 
which participants were encouraged to assign attention to the affective stimulus 
dimension. Because the emotional tone of pictures used in affective priming 
studies is typically more extreme than the emotional tone of words, pictures may 
be more effective in inducing selective attention for the affective stimulus di-
mension than words (Spruyt et al., 2009). 
Evidence obtained with the affective Simon task (De Houwer & Eelen, 
1998) points even further in this direction (Duscherer, Holender, & Molenaar, 
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2008). In this affective variant of the spatial Simon task (Simon, 1990; Simon & 
Rudell, 1967), participants are presented with words that vary independently on 
both the affective stimulus dimension and a nonaffective stimulus dimension 
(e.g., grammatical category). Crucially, participants are asked to categorize the 
words on the basis of the nonaffective stimulus dimension while using response 
labels that are affectively polarized (e.g., ‘good’-‘bad’). The irrelevant affective 
value of the stimulus words can thus either be congruent or incongruent with 
those of the response labels. Although the affective connotation of the words 
itself is irrelevant for the task at hand, one commonly observes slower and less 
accurate responses when the word and the response are affectively incongruent 
than when they are congruent. Duscherer et al. (2008) manipulated the propor-
tion of affective Simon trials on which affectively polarized stimuli were pre-
sented and found the affective Simon effect in the response latency data to 
come about only if the proportion of trials consisting of affectively polarized 
stimulus materials was high. 
This finding is important because it suggests that selective attention for 
affective stimulus information can be manipulated not only in a blatant manner 
via instructions and task demands (as in the studies of Spruyt et al., 2007, 2009) 
but also in a procedurally more subtle manner, that is, by varying the proportion 
of affective stimuli. To substantiate this idea, however, several issues need to be 
dealt with first. 
First of all, it should be emphasized that the findings of Duscherer et al.’s 
were not conclusive. Although the valence proportion had an impact on the af-
fective Simon effect in the reaction time data, a similar data pattern did not 
emerge in the error data. In fact, the error data revealed an affective Simon ef-
fect irrespective of the proportion of affectively polarized stimuli. One 
procedural detail that might account for this data pattern concerns the response 
labels used. While Duscherer et al. took great care in manipulating the propor-
tion of affective stimuli, the applied response labels were affectively polarized 
throughout the entire experiment (“positive” or “negative”). That is, irrespective 
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of whether the proportion of trials consisting of affectively polarized stimulus 
materials was high or low, participants still had to execute an affectively labeled 
response on all trials. As pointed out by Spruyt, Everaert, De Houwer, Moors, and 
Hermans (2008), the use of affectively polarized response labels can prompt one 
to selectively attend the affective stimulus dimension. It is therefore important 
that the valence proportion is manipulated in such a way that the proportion of 
affectively polarized responses is also low. 
 Second, even if the data of Duscherer et al. (2008) would have been con-
clusive, it still remains to be seen to what extent their findings generalize to 
other experimental tasks. It is possible, for instance, that the valence proportion 
moderates the affective Simon effect not because it influences automatic affec-
tive processing per se but because it influences the processes that mediate 
between automatic affective processing and the affective Simon effect, such as 
response competition (see Gawronski, Deutsch, LeBel, & Peters, 2008; Moors, 
Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2009; Spruyt, Gast, & Moors, 2011). To rule out such an 
interpretation, studies using other experimental tasks are vital. 
In the present experiment we examined whether the valence proportion of 
affective stimuli modulates affective priming of naming responses too. More 
specifically, we embedded critical naming trials in a large set of filler trials that 
either consisted of neutral stimuli (low valence proportion) or affective stimuli 
(high valence proportion). The affective priming effect was expected to be sig-
nificantly stronger in the high valence proportion condition than in the low va-
lence proportion condition. This experiment is important for several reasons. 
First of all, it is generally assumed that affective priming in the naming task is 
driven by processes other than those underlying the affective Simon effect (e.g., 
De Houwer, 2006; Gawronski et al., 2008; Moors et al., in press). Evidence that 
the valence proportion also influences priming effects in the naming task would 
therefore provide important additional support for the hypothesis that the pro-
portion of affective stimuli influences the probability of affective stimulus pro-
cessing rather than processes specific to the affective Simon effect. Second, in a 
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naming task, the proportion of affectively polarized responses is equal to the 
proportion of affectively polarized stimuli presented. The naming task is there-
fore better suited to study the impact of the valence proportion on automatic 
affective stimulus processing. 
Finally, the present study is important because it sheds new light on the 
conditions under which affective priming of naming responses can be obtained.  
METHOD 
Participants 
Due to the small to medium effect sizes generally associated with affective 
priming of naming responses, we performed a power analysis using a power 
coefficient of 0.80 and an effect size (d = 0.35) obtained in a study with similar 
stimulus materials and procedure (Spruyt & Hermans, 2008). This analysis re-
vealed an optimal sample size of 67 for each between-subjects condition, re-
sulting in an optimal total sample size of 134. We therefore recruited 106 under-
graduates at Ghent University (mean age = 19 years; 31 men, 75 women), with 
an implied power estimate of about 0.74 to detect a priming effect in each be-
tween-subjects condition. All participants took part of the study in exchange for 
course credit or a payment of € 8. 
Materials 
We used 60 prime pictures (30 positive and 30 negative) and 40 target 
words (20 positive nouns and 20 negative nouns) as experimental stimuli. These 
stimuli were used to create the experimental trials and were equal in both the 
low valence proportion and the high valence proportion condition. The prime 
pictures were selected on the basis of normative data collected by Spruyt et al. 
(2002). On a scale ranging from very negative (-5) to very positive (5), the mean 
affective ratings of the positive (M  = 2.23, SE = 0.10) and negative prime pictures 
(M  = -2.87, SE = 0.20) were significantly different, t(58) = 22.61, p < .001. The 
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target words were taken from a list of Dutch words that were rated on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 0 (very negative) to 7 (very positive) (Hermans & De Houwer, 
1994). The mean affective rating for the positive targets (M  = 6.16, SE = 0.08) 
was significantly higher than that for the negative targets (M = 1.49, SE = 0.05) 
and significantly different, t(38) = 47.11, p < .001. 
The primes for the filler trials were taken from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) and consisted of 20 
neutral pictures (M = 5.21, SE = 0.11), 10 positive pictures (M = 7.72, SE = 0.13), 
and 10 negative pictures (M = 2.73, SE = 0.09). The mean affective rating of the 
neutral primes differed significantly from that of the positive, t(28) = 13.79, p < 
.001, and the negative primes, t(28) = 14.67, p < .001. Obviously, the mean 
affective ratings of the positive and negative primes were significantly different 
as well, t(18) = 30.93, p < .001. 
The filler targets were taken from the word norms collected by Hermans 
and De Houwer (1994). These were 30 neutral nouns (M = 4.10, SE=.03), 15 
positive nouns (M = 6.1, SE = 0.09), and 15 negative nouns (M = 1.56, SE = 0.05). 
The mean affective ratings of the neutral nouns different significantly from both 
the positive and negative nouns, t(43) = 24.26, p < .001, and t(43) = 44.13, p < 
.001, respectively. The difference in mean affective ratings of the positive and 
negative targets was also reliable, t(28) = 44.42,  p <. 001. The filler trials in the 
low valence proportion condition were constructed using the neutral primes and 
targets. The affectively polarized stimuli were used to construct the filler trials in 
the high valence proportion condition. 
All pictures were sized to a width of 512 pixels and a height of 384 pixels. 
Target words were presented in a white, Arial font with a height of 28 pixels. All 
stimuli were presented against the black background of a 19-inch computer 
monitor with a refresh rate of 100 Hz and a screen resolution of 1024 × 768. The 
experiment was run using Affect 4.0 (Spruyt, Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, 
& Hermans, 2009). The responses were registered with an external voice key that 
was connected to the parallel port of the computer. 
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Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned either to the low valence proportion 
condition (n = 54) or the high valence proportion condition (n = 52). They were 
seated in front of the computer screen in a dimly-lit room. Instructions appeared 
on screen and were clarified by the experimenter when necessary. Participants 
were instructed to pronounce the target words as fast and as accurately as pos-
sible. They were informed that the prime pictures were irrelevant for the task. 
Participants in both conditions received the same set of experimental trials. In 
the low valence proportion condition experimental trials were embedded in a 
context of neutral filler trials. In the high valence proportion condition experi-
mental trials were embedded in a context of affective filler trials. 
For each participant, 40 experimental trials were created by randomly 
combining the experimental primes and targets with the restriction that each 
trial type (positive-positive, positive-negative, negative-positive, negative-
negative) occurred equally often. Because there were more prime pictures than 
experimental trials, a subset of 40 pictures was randomly drawn for each partici-
pant. There was no stimulus repetition for the experimental trials. 
Participants were presented with 120 additional filler trials. In the high va-
lence proportion condition, these filler trials were composed of affective primes 
and targets that were randomly combined with the restriction that each trial 
type (positive-positive, positive-negative, negative-positive, negative-negative) 
occurred equally often. The filler trials in the low valence proportion condition 
consisted of neutral primes and targets that were combined in a purely random 
fashion. Because of the large number of filler trials, stimulus repetition was al-
lowed for all filler trial types. The exact number of stimulus repetitions on the 
filler trials was not controlled for. 
The experiment started with 12 practice trials, followed by 160 randomly 
intermixed experimental and filler trials. The practice trials were randomly se-
lected from the complete set of filler trials. 
Each trial started with a 500-ms presentation of a fixation cross in the cen-
ter of the screen, followed by a 500-ms blank screen. The prime picture was pre-
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sented for 200 ms and the target appeared after a stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA) of 250 ms. The target word was then presented until a response was de-
tected or 2000 ms elapsed. Once the experimenter had coded the response, the 
next trial was initiated after an intertrial interval (ITI) that varied randomly be-
tween 500 ms and 1500 ms. 
RESULTS 
Only the data of the experimental trials were analyzed. Because the error 
rates associated with the experimental trials were very low (0.12 %), we limited 
our analyses to the response latencies. Data from experimental trials on which 
an incorrect response was given (0.12 %) or trials on which the voice key was 
triggered incorrectly (4.08 %) were excluded from the analysis. The impact of 
outlying values was reduced by excluding all response latencies (0.40 %) that 
deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations from a participant’s mean latency in 
a particular condition (see Ratcliff, 1993). The remaining data were submitted to 
a 2 (valence proportion: low vs. high) x 2 (prime valence: positive vs. negative) x 
2 (target valence: positive vs. negative) repeated measures ANOVA. Mean 
response latencies are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1. 
Mean Response Latencies and SDs for each Trial Type (in ms) as 
a Function of Condition. 
 
Trial type 
Valence 
Proportion 
(+,+)   (+,-)   (-,+)   (-,-) 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
Low 475 49 
 
500 57 
 
477 52 
 
508 56 
High 464 48  496 59  477 46  499 54 
Note. (+,+) = positive prime, positive target; (+,-) = positive prime, 
negative target; (-,+) = negative prime, positive target; (-,-) = 
negative prime, negative target. 
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The main effects of prime valence, F(1, 104) = 12.46, p < .001, MSE = 346, f 
= 0.35, and target valence, F(1, 104) = 132.17, p < .001, MSE = 603, f = 1.13, were 
both significant but did not interact, F(1,104) < 1. Targets preceded by positive 
primes were responded to more quickly than targets preceded by negative 
primes (mean difference of  6 ms; SD = 19 ms) and positive targets were re-
sponded to faster than negative targets (mean difference of 27 ms; SD = 24 ms). 
Importantly, the crucial three-way interaction between valence proportion, 
prime valence, and target valence was significant, F(1, 104) = 5.72, p < .05, MSE = 
316, and had a reasonable effect size, f = 0.23. To further investigate the nature 
of this three-way interaction, two separate 2 (prime valence: positive vs. 
negative) x 2 (target valence: positive vs. negative) repeated measures ANOVAs 
were conducted, one for each valence proportion condition. The interaction be-
tween prime valence and target valence was significant in the high valence pro-
portion condition, F(1, 51) = 4.21, p < .05, MSE = 335. There was a 5 ms (f = 0.29) 
difference between affectively congruent and incongruent trials (for our effect 
size estimation procedure, see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). In the low valence 
proportion condition, the interaction between prime valence and target valence 
did not reach significance, F(1,53) < 1.7, p = .19, MSE = 297, f = 0.18 (see Table 2, 
for the affective priming effects). 
Table 2. 
Mean Response Latencies and SDs for each Trial Type and 
Affective Priming Effects (in ms) as a Function of 
Condition. 
 
Trial type   
  Valence 
Proportion 
Congruent   Incongruent   APE 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
Low 492 50 
 
489 51 
 
-3 17 
High 482 49  487 51  5* 18 
Note. APE = affective priming effect. 
 *p < .05, two-tailed. 
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 Note that, in the high valence proportion condition, both the main effect 
of prime valence and the main effect of target valence also reached significance. 
More specifically, positive target trials were responded to faster than negative 
target trials, F(1,51) = 73.81, p < .001, MSE = 508, f = 0.44, and positive prime 
trials were responded to faster than negative prime trials, F(1,51) = 9.99, p < .01, 
MSE = 304, f = 1.20. As a result, it is difficult to interpret affective priming effects 
for specific subsets of trials. For example, a comparison of positive and negative 
target trials within each level of prime valence would lead to an overestimation 
of the affective priming effect on positive prime trials and an underestimation on 
negative prime trials. Similarly, a comparison of positive and negative prime trials 
within each level of target valence would lead to an overestimation of the 
affective priming effect on positive target trials and an underestimation on nega-
tive target trials. In line with this reasoning, the difference between congruent 
and incongruent primes was statistically reliable on positive target trials F(1,51) = 
15.54, p < .001, MSE = 276, f = 0.55. but not on negative target trials (F <1, see 
Table 1).  Likewise, a comparison between congruent and incongruent targets 
revealed a highly significant affective priming effect for positive prime trials, 
F(1,51) = 64.50, p < .001, MSE = 414, f = 1.12, and even a significant contrast 
effect for negative prime trials, F(1,51) = 28.40, p < .001, MSE = 429, f = 0.75. It 
must be clear however that these contrasts are deflated/inflated by main effects 
of prime valence and target valence. For these reasons, we are reluctant to cal-
culate affective priming effects for one category of prime valence or target 
valence (also, see Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003). 
DISCUSSION 
According to the selective-attention framework of semantic priming put 
forward by Spruyt et al. (2009), the semantic analysis of task-irrelevant stimuli 
depends on the extent to which specific (semantic) stimulus dimensions are se-
lectively attended to. In line with this framework, previous studies have shown 
that affective stimulus processing depends strongly on the extent to which atten-
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tion is assigned to the affective stimulus dimension (e.g., Spruyt et al., 2007, 
2009). In each of these studies, however, feature-specific attention allocation 
was manipulated in a salient manner via explicit instructions and task require-
ments. The merits and scope of the selective-attention framework put forward 
by Spruyt et al. (2009) would be severely limited if only such manipulations 
would have effect on automatic semantic stimulus processing. In the present 
study we examined whether affective priming in the naming tasks depends on 
the number of trials that consisted of affectively polarized stimulus materials 
(i.e., the valence proportion). In line with our expectations, we observed that the 
affective priming effect in the naming task was modulated by the valence pro-
portion. As indicated by the significant three-way interaction between prime, 
target, and condition, affective priming was more pronounced in the high va-
lence proportion condition than in the low valence proportion condition. This 
data pattern shows that procedurally subtle manipulations of feature-specific 
attention allocation can have a clear impact on automatic affective stimulus pro-
cessing, and on automatic semantic stimulus processing in general. 
Our findings shed new light on the mixed findings that have been obtained 
earlier with the naming task. In contrast to the many failures to observe affective 
priming of naming responses (e.g., Klauer & Musch, 2001; Spruyt et al., 2004), 
Spruyt et al. (2002) did observe robust effects when pictures instead of words 
were used as primes and targets. According to the selective-attention 
hypothesis, this effect results from the fact that the pictures used in affective 
priming research are typically very graphic and more extreme in their affective 
meaning than words. Pictures might therefore be more successful in inducing 
selective attention for affective stimulus information as do words. Our results 
support this hypothesis by showing that a subtle, non-instructional element of 
the procedure such as the valence proportion can influence affective priming 
effects. Of course, some published studies did show affective priming of naming 
responses despite the fact that neither pictures were used nor special measures 
were taken to draw attention to the valence of the stimuli (Bargh et al., 1996; 
Hermans et al., 1994). We can only speculate about the precise procedural fac-
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tors that were responsible for these findings. Irrespectively, our results do show 
that subtle, non-instructional aspects of the procedure (such as the precise set of 
stimuli that is used) can influence the magnitude of the affective priming effect. 
Our findings are also important for the discussion concerning the automa-
ticity of affective stimulus processing. Given that the naming task does not re-
quire one to adopt an (explicit) evaluative processing mindset, it has been 
argued that finding affective priming of naming responses provides strong evi-
dence for the hypothesis that automatic affective stimulus evaluation can take 
place in an unconditional fashion. The present data clearly show, however, that 
finding an affective priming effect in the naming task is still insufficient to war-
rant such a conclusion. Even so, it should be emphasized that our findings are 
not necessarily inconsistent with the generic idea that affective stimulus pro-
cessing can proceed in an automatic fashion. In accordance with a 
decompositional view of automaticity (Moors & De Houwer, 2006, see also 
Footnote 1), we merely contest the alleged unconditonality of automatic 
affective stimulus processing, not the idea that affective stimulus information 
can be processed in an automatic fashion under certain conditions per se. 
Finally, we would like to point out that the present reasoning is valid only if 
one assumes that the magnitude of the affective priming effect is directly related 
to the extent of affective stimulus processing. In contrast, one might argue that 
the effect of feature-specific attention allocation on affective priming is situated 
at the level of the processes that translate affective processing into affective 
priming effects rather than at the level of affective processing itself (e.g., 
Gawronski, et al., 2008; Moors et al., 2010; Spruyt, Gast, & Moors, 2011). More 
reliable claims could be made when different measures of affective stimulus pro-
cessing provide similar outcomes despite the fact that different underlying 
mechanisms are at play. The fact that our results converge with those obtained 
by Duscherer et al. (2008) with the affective Simon task therefore suggests that 
the effect of feature-specific attention allocation is not paradigm-specific. Never-
theless, studies that confirm the impact of feature-specific attention allocation 
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on other indices of automatic affective stimulus processing are needed to firmly 
substantiate our claims. Recently, our lab undertook such efforts (Everaert, 
Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2012) using the emotional Stroop paradigm (Pratto & 
John, 1991). Mirroring Spruyt et al. (2009), we presented participants with trials 
that were traditional emotional Stroop trials or trials that were aimed at inducing 
attention allocation to a specific stimulus feature. As expected, the emotional 
Stroop effect was stronger when participants selectively attended the affective 
stimulus dimension. 
In summary, the present experiment demonstrated a clear impact of va-
lence proportion on affective priming of naming responses. Affective priming 
was stronger when the proportion of affective stimuli was high compared to 
when this proportion was low. We attributed this result to differences in feature-
specific attention allocation evoked by different proportions of affective infor-
mation. These findings underline the fact that the observation of affective 
priming effects in the naming task is insufficient to conclude that affective pro-
cessing is unconditional. 
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APPENDIX 
Stimuli in the experimental list 
Positive prime pictures. balloons; a rose; a teddy bear; a butterfly; a 
smiling woman; a waterfall; a sunset; a kitten; a bride; a present; a father with 
baby; a naked couple hugging; a nude female swimmer; a tropical coast; two 
smiling people making the peace sign; a couple; newlyweds; a dolphin; a squirrel; 
a baby; a candle; an air balloon; a Christmas tree; smiling man; white clouds; a 
rainbow; a pretty woman; a smiling baby; a strawberry; an orange. 
Negative prime pictures. barb wire; an inflamed breast; an angry man; gun 
pointed at the camera; a bloody dead calf; a knife held against a female neck; a 
gun pointed at a woman; a man running with an injured child in his arms; trash; a 
car crash; a crying African child; a starved woman; maggots; an explosion; a 
gasmask; an injured man; a white shark; a spider; a dog with exposed teeth; a 
dead dog in a slaughterhouse; an injection; a floating corpse; injured lips; a 
wounded man; a crying man; a snake; a gun; skulls; a baby with a tumor; a house 
on fire. 
Positive target words. LIEFDE (love); VRIEND (friend); VAKANTIE (vacation); 
VREDE (peace); TROUW (loyal); ROMANTIEK (romance); MUZIEK (Music); THUIS 
(home); HUMOR (comedy); LEVEN (life); WARMTE (warmth); FEEST (party); 
DROOM (dream); GEZONDHEID (health); APPLAUS (applause); TROTS (pride); 
SCHOONHEID (beauty); LACH (smile); ZOMER (summer); KNUFFEL (hug). 
Negative target words. MOORD (murder); VERKRACHTING (rape); INCEST 
(incest); STANK (stench); AIDS (aids); MARTELING (torture); TUMOR (tumor); 
HAAT (hate); ONGELUK (accident); ALCOHOLISME (alcoholism); PEDOFIEL 
(pedophile); SLACHTING (slaughter); COMA (coma); HEL (hell); INFECTIE 
(infection); WERKLOOSHEID (unemployment); SADIST (sadist); BRAAKSEL (vomit); 
TIRAN (tyrant); VERSTIKKING (suffocation). 
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Stimuli in the valent context list 
Positive prime pictures (IAPS numbers). 1440; 1463; 1604; 1750; 1920; 
2070; 2311; 2550; 5831; 7430. 
Negative prime pictures (IAPS numbers). 2276; 2750; 3300; 9000; 9001; 
9041; 9220; 9280; 9290; 9561. 
Positive target words. KUS (kiss); OMHELZING (embrace); ZON (sun); 
BLOEMEN (flowers); LENTE (spring); GESCHENK (gift); VERRASSING (surprise); 
CADEAU (present); BRUID (bride); BLOESEM (blossom); VLINDER (butterfly); 
WENS (wish); HEMEL (heaven); BOEKET (bouquet); MELODIE (melody). 
Negative target words. OORLOG (war); EXECUTIE (execution); BOMMEN 
(bombs); KANKER (cancer); GEZWEL (swelling); MISDAAD (crime); GEWEREN 
(rifles); KOGEL (bullets); DRUGS (drugs); ZIEKTE (disease); GANGSTER (gangster); 
GIJZELAAR (hostage); BEDREIGING (threat); VIRUS (virus); LIJK (corpse). 
Stimuli in the neutral context list 
Neutral prime pictures (IAPS numbers). 2214; 2280; 2575; 5395; 5455; 
5535; 6150; 7095; 7096; 7130; 7186; 7190; 7207; 7211; 7495; 7550; 7560; 7620; 
7820; 7830. 
Neutral target words. DOOS (box); PAPIER (paper); DISCO (disco); BORD 
(plate); TAS (cup); STOEP (pavement); STREEP (line); VIERKANT (square); ACCENT 
(accent); BOOG (bow); GIST (yeast); TROMPET (trumpet); VERGELIJK 
(agreement); LIJN (line); POOL (pole); PARADE (parade); SCHAAR (scissors); TAND 
(tooth); AGENTSCHAP (agency); TRAPEZIUM (trapezium); KAPPER (hairdresser); 
TAPIJT (carpet); MAGAZINE (magazine); KRANT (newspaper); HOED (hat); STOEL 
(chair); BALPEN (ball pen); MAND (basket); TAFEL (table); CIRKEL (circle). 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON THE MALLEABILITY OF AUTOMATIC ATTENTIONAL 
BIAS:  
EFFECTS OF FEATURE-SPECIFIC ATTENTION ALLOCATION 1 
 
 
In two experiments, we examined the extent to which automatic attentional 
biases, as indexed by performance in the emotional Stroop task (Experiment 1) 
and the dot probe task (Experiment 2), are modulated by feature-specific atten-
tion allocation. In both experiments, participants were encouraged to attend to 
either affective stimulus information (affective groups) or non-affective, semantic 
stimulus information (non-affective groups). Attentional bias towards negative 
stimuli was found in the affective groups but not in the non-affective groups. In 
Experiment 1, we also observed an attentional bias towards non-affective seman-
tic stimulus information in the non-affective groups but not in the affective 
groups. We argue that these effects are due to a modulation of automatic stim-
ulus processing by feature-specific attention allocation, which consequently af-
fects automatic attentional biases. Our data demonstrate that automatic atten-
tional biases toward negative stimuli are not unconditional but depend on the 
relevance of negative information. Moreover, the results of Experiment 1 suggest 
that attention is automatically allocated also to non-affective stimulus dimen-
sions that are currently relevant. 
                                                     
1 Based on Everaert, T., Spruyt, A., & De Houwer, J. (2012). On the 
malleability of automatic attentional bias: Effects of feature-specific attention 
allocation. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is a well-established fact that the affective connotation of a stimulus can 
be processed in a fairly unconditional, automatic fashion. Numerous studies have 
shown that stimulus evaluation is driven by fast (e.g., Hermans, De Houwer, & 
Eelen, 2001) and efficient processes (e.g., Hermans, Crombez, & Eelen, 2000) 
that are not dependent upon the conscious identification of the instigating ob-
ject (e.g., Draine & Greenwald, 1998), or the activation of an explicit evaluative 
processing goal (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; but see Spruyt, 
De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009; and Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2007). 
There is also evidence showing that the automatic evaluation of a stimulus 
has important consequences. 
First, it can result in the automatic pre-activation of affectively congruent 
responses. De Houwer and Eelen (1998), for instance, asked participants to cate-
gorize affectively polarized words according to their grammatical category using 
the response labels ‘positive’ and ‘negative’. They found that participants were 
quicker to say ‘positive’ to a positive word and ‘negative’ to a negative word, 
even though the affective value of the word was not task relevant. The affective 
connotation of the words appeared to automatically activate a response ten-
dency that led to the pre-activation of affectively congruent responses (e.g. re-
sponding “positive” to “flower”) as opposed to affectively incongruent responses 
(e.g. responding “positive” to “gun”). Another paradigm that can be used to cap-
ture this consequence is the affective priming paradigm (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, 
Powell, & Kardes, 1986; see Klauer & Musch, 2003 for a review). In this para-
digm, participants are asked to affectively categorize affectively polarized target 
stimuli, each of which is preceded by the short presentation of an affectively 
polarized prime stimulus. Performance is usually better when the prime stimulus 
and the target stimulus belong to the same affective category (e.g. the words 
“baby” and “flower”) than when they do not (e.g. the words “murderer” and 
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“flower”). The prime stimulus is thought to pre-activate a response tendency 
that is affectively congruent or incongruent with the response to the target stim-
ulus and thus affects further responding. 
The affective priming paradigm can also capture another consequence of 
automatic stimulus evaluation, namely effects at the stimulus encoding level. 
This consequence becomes apparent when the affective priming paradigm is 
adapted in such a way that participants no longer have to affectively categorize 
target stimuli but are asked to name them instead. In such a task, the response 
tendencies activated by the prime stimuli are not part of the response set re-
quired to perform the task at hand. Pre-activation of affectively congruent re-
sponses can therefore be ruled out as a source for affective priming effects in the 
naming  task. Nevertheless, several researchers did find affective priming effects 
when employing this task (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Spruyt et 
al., 2009; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, and Eelen, 2002; Spruyt, Hermans, De 
Houwer, Vandromme, & Eelen, 2007; Wentura & Frings, 2008), suggesting that 
the automatic evaluation of the prime stimulus speeds up the processing of a 
target stimulus that belongs to the same affective category. On the basis of this 
finding, it has been argued that the automatic evaluation of a stimulus affects 
subsequent stimulus encoding. 
Finally, the automatic evaluation of a stimulus can exert an influence on 
the automatic allocation of attention. More specifically, it has been shown that 
negative or threatening stimuli tend to attract attention (for a review, see Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Yiend, 
2010). Two paradigms often used to measure this attentional bias are the emo-
tional Stroop task and the dot probe task. In the emotional Stroop task, partici-
pants name the ink color of sequentially presented words. Performance is usually 
worse when the presented word has a negative meaning than when it is affec-
tively neutral (e.g., Pratto & John, 1991). This emotional Stroop effect is thought 
to reflect the power of negative, threatening information to draw attention away 
from the task of naming the color (for a review, see Williams, Matthews, & 
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MacLeod, 1996). In the dot probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), par-
ticipants are asked to respond to (the location of) a neutral probe stimulus that is 
presented on one of two possible screen locations. A neutral and a negative 
stimulus are presented in these locations shortly before the probe presentation. 
Performance is typically better when the probe appears on the location in which 
a negative stimulus has been shown, suggesting that the negative stimulus at-
tracts attention to that location. These effects of attentional bias tend to be 
more pronounced and reliable in high-anxious populations (Bar-Haim, et al., 
2007; Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, 
Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004). 
By definition, attentional and other consequences of automatic stimulus 
evaluation depend on the presence of automatic stimulus evaluation and thus on 
its enabling conditions. Recent studies conducted at our lab suggest, however, 
that automatic stimulus evaluation itself is not unconditional but occurs only 
under certain conditions (Everaert, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2011; Spruyt, De 
Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 2012; Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 
2007; Spruyt et al., 2009). Spruyt et al. (2009) for instance, presented partici-
pants with affective priming trials and asked them to name the target words on 
only 25% of all trials. On the remaining 75% of the trials (hereinafter referred to 
as ‘induction trials’), one group of participants categorized target words as either 
“good” or “bad” (the affective group) whereas the second group of participants 
categorized target words as either “humans” or “objects” (the non-affective 
group). Affective priming of naming responses was observed in the affective 
group only. Conversely, participants in the non-affective group displayed non-
affective semantic category priming effects only (i.e. better performance when 
prime and target both denoted a human or an object than when they did not). If 
stimulus evaluation truly occurs in an unconditional fashion, affective priming of 
naming responses should have taken place irrespective of which categorization 
task was performed on the induction trials. 
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To account for these findings, Spruyt et al. (2009) hypothesized that the 
semantic analysis of task-irrelevant stimuli is dependent on feature-specific at-
tention allocation (FSAA). Whenever affective stimulus information is selectively 
attended to, automatic affective stimulus processing of task-irrelevant stimuli is 
expected to occur. When selective attention is directed to non-affective seman-
tic stimulus information, however, task-irrelevant stimuli are assumed to be pro-
cessed in terms of the non-affective semantic properties that are selectively at-
tended to. In other words, the affective connotation of a stimulus will be pro-
cessed in an automatic fashion only if attention is allocated to the affective fea-
tures of the stimulus. Likewise, non-affective semantic stimulus features will be 
encoded automatically only if they are attended to. 
Several other studies further corroborated this hypothesis. Spruyt, De 
Houwer, Everaert, and Hermans (2012), for instance, demonstrated that FSAA 
can affect even the affective processing of (prime) stimuli that are presented 
below awareness thresholds. Everaert et al. (2011) showed that subtle aspects of 
the experimental procedure, such as a high valence-proportion (i.e., the propor-
tion of affective stimuli in the environment) can suffice to promote automatic 
affective stimulus processing (see also, Duscherer, Holender, & Molenaar, 2008). 
Because automatic affective stimulus processing is dependent on FSAA, 
one can expect that attentional and other consequences of automatic evaluation 
are also contingent upon FSAA. The primary aim of the research reported in this 
manuscript was to examine whether attentional bias for negative stimuli de-
pends on selective attention towards negative stimulus information. More spe-
cifically, we tested the prediction that automatic attentional bias towards nega-
tive stimuli is stronger when negative stimulus information is selectively at-
tended to than when non-affective, semantic stimulus information is selectively 
attended to. Such a result would not only provide further evidence for the im-
portance of FSAA in automatic affective processing but would also question the 
common assumption that negative stimuli attract attention in an unconditional 
manner (e.g., Öhman & Mineka, 2001).  
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A secondary aim of this manuscript was to examine whether FSAA is suffi-
cient to induce an attentional bias effect. According to this hypothesis, automatic 
attentional biases should occur for any stimulus that is characterized by a feature 
that is selectively attended to, regardless of whether this feature has an affective 
connotation or not. In line with this reasoning, prior studies have demonstrated 
that people show an automatic attentional bias for stimuli that are somehow 
relevant for them. Emotional Stroop effects, for instance, are typically more pro-
nounced when the words relate to a person’s current concerns (e.g. Riemann & 
McNally, 1995). Likewise, stimuli relevant to a person’s current goals evoke an 
attentional bias in the dot probe paradigm (Vogt, De Houwer, Moors, Van 
Damme, & Crombez, 2010) and the visual search paradigm (e.g. Folk, Remington, 
and Johnston, 1992). There is also evidence showing that stimuli that are held in 
working memory produce an attentional bias in visual search tasks as well (Soto, 
Hodsoll, Rothstein, & Humphreys, 2008). It is important to point out, however, 
that each of these effects were stimulus-specific. Vogt et al. (2010), for instance, 
observed attentional biases towards goal-relevant stimuli (e.g., ‘stripe’), but 
these effects did not generalize to words that were semantically related to the 
goal (e.g. ‘line’). The FSAA account, however, predicts that attentional biases can 
occur not only for specific stimuli, but for any stimulus that possesses a particular 
feature that is selectively attended to. Such a finding would also show that the 
automatic allocation of attention can be biased not only by the relevance of a 
stimulus as a whole but also by the relevance of one particular stimulus feature 
or stimulus dimension. 
In two studies, we used Spruyt et al.’s (2009) manipulation of FSAA to test 
its effects on performance in the emotional Stroop task (Experiment 1) and the 
dot probe task (Experiment 2). To this end, we mixed trials in which participants 
performed these tasks with so-called induction trials. In the induction trials, a 
categorization task was performed to encourage participants to selectively at-
tend either to affective or to non-affective stimulus information. In each experi-
ment, one group of participants (the affective group) performed an affective 
categorization task (i.e., “negative” vs. “not negative”). Another group of partici-
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pants (the non-affective group) performed a semantic categorization task (i.e., 
“human” vs. “not human”). As such, participants in the affective groups were 
encouraged to attend to affective stimulus information whereas participants in 
the non-affective groups were encouraged to attend to non-affective semantic 
stimulus information that was relevant for the discrimination between stimuli 
that did or did not refer to humans. We hypothesized that an attentional bias for 
negative stimuli would emerge in the affective groups only. In the non-affective 
groups, we assumed that an attentional bias would take place for stimuli that 
referred to humans, as the induction task would render them goal-relevant. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Methods 
Participants 
Sixty-six undergraduate students at Ghent University participated in this 
study (Mage = 19.4; 20 men, 46 women). They were given course credit or were 
paid € 8 for participation. All participants were native Dutch-speakers and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Materials 
The stimulus set consisted of 4 word categories, each containing 24 stimuli 
(96 words in total, see Appendix A). We obtained affective ratings of these words 
from 19 independent subjects that judged the affective value of each word on a 
9-point scale going from negative to positive. The words could denote a neutral 
human (e.g., observer; Mvalence = 5.36, SD = 0.52), a negative human (e.g., rapist; 
Mvalence = 2.13, SD = 0.60), a neutral non-human (e.g., building; Mvalence = 5.26, SD 
= 0.36), or a negative non-human (e.g., grenade; Mvalence = 1.95, SD = 0.56).  The 
mean affective ratings of the negative word categories differed significantly from 
those of the neutral word categories, t’s > 19, p’s < .001. There were no signifi-
cant differences between the mean affective ratings of the two negative word 
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categories, t(46) = 1.07, p = .29 or the two neutral word categories, t(46) < 1. 
Furthermore, word norms collected by Keuleers, Brysbaert, and New (2010) con-
firmed that there were no significant differences between the different word 
categories regarding word length, t’s < 1.93, p’s > .060 and log frequency, t’s < 
1.66, p’s > .103. 
We selected nine additional words (see Appendix A) to serve as stimuli in 
the practice phases. These words were either negative non-human, neutral non-
human, or neutral human, with three words for each category. 
All words were presented in an Arial, lowercase font with a size of 28 
pixels. They could be presented in one of five colors: white, red, green, blue, and 
yellow. The experiment was run on a computer with an Intel D930 (3.2 GHz) pro-
cessor connected to a 19 inch monitor with a refresh rate of 100 Hz. We used 
two input devices to register responses: a voice key that was connected to the 
computer’s parallel port and a two-button response box that was connected to 
the computer’s gameport. The experiment was programmed using Affect 4.0 
(Spruyt, Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2010). 
Procedure 
All participants were tested individually in a dimly lit room. They were ran-
domly assigned to either the affective group (n = 33) or the non-affective group 
(n = 33). The instructions were presented on the screen but were clarified orally 
by the experimenter upon request of the participant. 
Participants were asked to perform the induction task when a word was 
presented in a white font and the emotional Stroop task when a word was pre-
sented in any other color.  
In the affective group, participants were asked to categorize white target 
words as either “negative” (left button press) or “not negative” (right button 
press) using the response box. In the non-affective group, participants were 
asked to categorize these target words as either “human” (left button press) or 
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“not human” (right button press). The emotional Stroop task was identical in 
both groups. Participants named the ink color of colored target words in the mi-
crophone connected to the voice key. The experimenter coded the participants’ 
vocal responses afterwards with the keyboard of the computer. Four keys were 
assigned for each color and one key was used to code a voice key failure. 
A trial started with a 500-ms presentation of a fixation cross in the center 
of the screen. After an inter-stimulus interval of 500 ms, the target word ap-
peared in one of the five possible colors that indicated which task had to be 
performed. In all cases, the word disappeared from the screen when the partici-
pant gave a response. The inter-trial interval was initiated after the participant’s 
response in the induction task or after the experimenter’s coding response in the 
emotional Stroop task. This inter-trial interval varied randomly between 500 ms 
and 1500 ms. 
Participants were subjected to three practice phases and one experimental 
phase. In the first practice phase, all participants performed 12 emotional Stroop 
trials. In the second phase, 12 induction trials were presented. In the third prac-
tice phase, 12 trials of each task were randomly intermixed. 
Because the use of affectively polarized stimuli can be sufficient to induce 
selective attention for affective stimulus information (Everaert et al., 2011), the 
practice stimuli in the non-affective group belonged to the neutral word catego-
ries. Likewise, the practice stimuli in the affective group belonged to the non-
human word categories. Accordingly, only 6 of the 9 practice stimuli were used in 
each group. 
The experimental phase of the experiment consisted of 48 induction trials 
and 48 emotional Stroop trials that were randomly intermixed. For each partici-
pant separately, the initial set of 96 words was semi-randomly split in two sets of 
48 words, each containing an equal numbers of words that belonged to the same 
word category (neutral human, neutral non-human, negative human, negative 
non-human). One set of words was used for the induction trials, the other set 
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was used for the emotional Stroop trials. Each word was presented exactly once. 
The occurrence of different word colors in the emotional Stroop task was coun-
terbalanced across different word categories (i.e., three words of each category 
in each color). 
Results 
The analysis was restricted to the data of the emotional Stroop task. Be-
cause participants made very few errors (1.24%), reaction-time data were the 
primary focus of analysis. For the reaction-time analysis, we excluded reaction 
times of trials with errors and trials in which the voice key was triggered 
inaccurately (2.94%). To lessen the impact of outlying values we also discarded 
trials with reaction times that differed more than 2.5 standard deviations from a 
participant’s mean reaction time in a particular condition (1.45%, see Ratcliff, 
1993). 
For each participant, we calculated the mean Stroop scores for affective 
stimulus information and non-affective stimulus information. The emotional 
Stroop score reflected the difference in color naming latency between the nega-
tive words and the neutral words. The human Stroop score reflected the differ-
ence in color naming latency between the words that denoted a human and the 
words that did not, regardless of stimulus valence (see Table 1 for the mean la-
tencies). 
We ran a 2 (group: affective vs. non-affective) × 2 (stimulus information: 
affective vs. non-affective) repeated measures ANOVA on the participants’ mean 
Stroop scores. The crucial two-way interaction between group and stimulus in-
formation was highly significant, F(1,64) = 11.00, p = .002, MSE = 2345, f = 0.42. 
The main effects of group and stimulus information were not significant, F(1,64) 
= 1.89, p = .174, MSE = 2067, and F(1,64) < 1, respectively. 
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Table 1. 
Mean reaction times and SDs (in ms) in Experiment 1, for each stimulus 
information type as a function of group. 
 
Stimulus Dimension 
 
Affective   Non-affective 
Group 
Negative   Neutral 
 
Human   
Non-
Human 
M SD   M SD   M SD   M SD 
Affective 749 97 
 
721 90 
 
735 94 
 
737 92 
Non-affective 739 99  729 93  753 97  716 94 
 
Follow-up analyses confirmed that the emotional Stroop effect was 
significant only in the affective group, M = 28 ms, F(1,32) = 11.05, p = .002, MSE = 
2272, d = 0.58. In the non-affective group, the emotional Stroop effect was not 
significant, M = 10 ms, F(1,32) = 1.51, p = 0.228, d = 0.29. In contrast, participants 
in the non-affective group responded significantly slower to words that denoted 
humans than words that did not, M = 37 ms, F(1,32) = 22.89, p < .001, MSE = 
1953, d = 0.83. Participants in the affective group did not show such an effect, M 
= -2 ms, F(1,32) < 1. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 are completely in line with the predictions that 
we derived from the FSAA account.  
First, the emotional Stroop effect was stronger and significant only when 
participants selectively attended to affective stimulus information. When non-
affective stimulus information was selectively attended to, no significant emo-
tional Stroop effect was observed. This data pattern is consistent with the idea 
that automatic attentional biases to negative stimuli depend on selective atten-
tion to negative stimulus information. It also shows that negative stimuli do not 
unconditionally evoke an attentional bias effect. Instead, automatic allocation of 
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attention to negative stimuli depends on the current relevance of negative in-
formation. 
Second, when participants were encouraged to selectively attend to stim-
ulus information relevant for the discrimination between humans and non-
humans, color naming reaction times were consistently slower when a word re-
ferred to a human than when it did not. Participants thus exhibited an effect 
similar to the emotional Stroop effect, but related to the selectively attended, 
non-affective stimulus information. These effects show that FSAA can induce an 
automatic attentional bias for non-affective stimuli that share a selectively at-
tended feature. 
It should be noted, however, that the processes underlying effects in the 
emotional Stroop paradigm are currently under debate. Several authors have 
argued that processes unrelated to the deployment of attention can also account 
for the emotional Stroop effect (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004; Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; De Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994; McKenna & Sharma, 2004; Phaf & Kan, 2007; 
Yiend, 2010). Yiend (2010), for instance, argued that Stroop effects might reflect 
a slow-down of response selection rather than attention capture. Furthermore, 
McKenna and Sharma (2004; see also Algom et al., 2004; Frings, Englert, 
Wentura, & Bermeitinger, 2010) pointed out that the emotional Stroop effect is 
at least partially driven by a slow disengagement process that slows down per-
formance on subsequent trials, as opposed to a fast attentional process that 
slows down performance on the current trial only (see also Phaf & Kan, 2007). 
For two reasons, however, it seems unlikely that the effects obtained in our 
study were driven by a slow disengagement process instead of a fast attentional 
process. First, unlike classical emotional Stroop studies, we presented the differ-
ent stimulus types randomly within one block. Under such conditions, a slow 
disengagement process is unable to contribute to the overall effects as the 
probability that a trial with a negative word or a trial with neutral word would 
follow a particular trial was equal across all trials. Second, we found a clear effect 
of stimulus type on current performance only. That is, follow-up analyses re-
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vealed that the nature of trial n-1 exerted no influence on the observed effects 
whatsoever, F’s < 1.  
Irrespective of this debate, it is important to emphasize that emotional 
Stroop effects can take place only if the affective meaning of a stimulus is pro-
cessed. Therefore, our data are in line with earlier reports of our lab showing 
that FSAA modulates automatic affective stimulus processing. Nevertheless, to 
further corroborate our claims regarding the modulation of the attentional con-
sequences of automatic stimulus evaluation, we decided to conceptually 
replicate Experiment 1 using the dot probe task as an attentional bias measure 
(Macleod et al., 1986). 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
Participants 
In this study, 43 undergraduate students at Ghent University participated 
(Mage = 18.8; 36 women, 7 men) in exchange for course credit. All participants 
were native Dutch-speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Materials 
We selected several stimulus sets from the IAPS picture database based on 
the norm data provided by Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert (1999). For the dot probe 
task, we selected 12 pictures for each of four possible stimulus categories: 
neutral humans (Mvalence = 5.18, SD = 0.43), neutral non-humans (Mvalence = 5.05, 
SD = 0.31), negative humans (Mvalence = 2.61, SD = 0.56), and negative non-
humans (Mvalence = 2.83, SD = 0.33). Hence, a total of 48 pictures were used for 
the dot probe task. The mean affective ratings of the pictures in each negative 
category did not differ significantly from one another, t(22) = 1.14, p = .266. 
Likewise, the mean affective ratings of the pictures in each neutral category did 
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not differ significantly as well, t(22) = 0.84, p = .410. The mean affective rating of 
each negative category differed significantly from the mean affective rating of 
each neutral category, t’s > 12, p’s < .001. 
To maximize the manipulation of feature-specific attention allocation, the 
stimuli used on the induction trials varied only on the stimulus dimension that 
was task-relevant on the induction trials (see Everaert et al., 2011; Spruyt et al., 
2009). In the non-affective group, the stimuli used for the induction trials were 8 
affectively neutral humans (Mvalence = 5.45, SD = 0.81) and 8 affectively neutral 
pictures that did not display humans (non-humans; Mvalence = 5.28, SD = 0.56). In 
the affective group, the same set of affectively neutral pictures depicting humans 
was combined with 8 negative pictures of both humans and objects (Mvalence = 
2.69, SD = 0.74). The mean affective rating of the negative induction pictures 
differed significantly from the mean affective ratings of the neutral induction 
pictures, all t’s > 7, all p’s < .001. The mean affective ratings of the pictures in the 
neutral categories did not differ significantly across categories, t(14) < 1.The 
critical stimuli used for the dot probe task thus were the same for all partici-
pants, while the stimuli used in the induction task could be different. 
Similar to the selection and the allocation of the practice stimuli in 
Experiment 1, we selected nine additional pictures to be used in the practice 
phases. These pictures contained either a neutral human (n = 3, Mvalence = 6.84, 
SD = 0.53), a neutral non-human (n = 3, Mvalence = 6.46, SD = 1.17), or a negative 
object or human (n = 3, Mvalence = 2.44, SD = 0.97).  
In the non-affective group, the stimuli in the practice phases consisted of 
neutral human pictures and neutral non-human pictures. In the affective group, 
these stimuli consisted of negative pictures and the neutral non-human pictures.  
All pictures were resized to a width of 264 pixels and a height of 198 pixels. 
The experiment was run with the hardware and software of Experiment 1. 
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Procedure 
All participants were tested individually in a dimly lit room and were ran-
domly assigned to either the affective group (n = 22) or the non-affective group 
(n = 21). They were seated approximately 75 cm from the screen. All instruction 
were presented on the computer screen but were clarified orally by the experi-
menter when requested by the participant. 
Each trial started with the presentation of three horizontally centered, ver-
tically aligned white rectangles on a black background. Each rectangle was 270 
pixels wide and 204 pixels high and subtended visual angles of 7.2° horizontally 
and 5.5° vertically. The rectangles were presented in such a way that the bottom 
rectangle and the top rectangle were 7 pixels apart from the middle rectangle. 
The centers of the top and bottom rectangle subtended a visual angle of 11.3°. 
 A fixation cross was presented for 500 ms in the center of the middle rec-
tangle. After the presentation of the fixation cross, participants performed the 
induction task when a picture was presented in the middle rectangle and the dot 
probe task when no picture was presented in the middle rectangle. 
The induction task in the affective group required participants to categorize 
the target pictures as “negative” or “not negative”. In the non-affective group, 
participants were asked to categorize the picture as either a “human” or not 
(“not human”). The picture was erased from the screen when the participant 
uttered a response. A voice key was used to register the response latencies. The 
experimenter coded the participant’s verbal response afterwards, which initiated 
an inter-trial interval that varied randomly between 500 ms and 1500 ms. 
The dot probe task was identical in both groups and was modeled after 
previous studies of Dewitte, Koster, De Houwer, and Buysse (2007), Vogt, De 
Houwer, and Crombez (2011), and Vogt, Lozo, Koster, and De Houwer (2011). 
Two pictures were presented simultaneously in the upper and lower rectangle. 
After 350 ms, the pictures were erased from the screen and a small square with a 
diameter of 30 pixels was presented in the center of the upper or lower rectan-
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gle. Participants were informed that the pictures were task-irrelevant and were 
asked to indicate the position of the square with the left or the right key of the 
response box. The response mappings were counterbalanced across participants. 
The small square disappeared when the participant responded, after which the 
randomly varying inter-trial interval was initiated. 
Similar to Experiment 1, participants performed 3 practice phases before 
they started the experimental phase. Participants first completed 12 dot probe 
trials, followed by 12 induction trials, and then completed the final practice 
phase in which 12 trials of each task were presented in a random order. 
The experimental phase of the experiment consisted of 72 experimental 
trials and 72 induction trials, presented randomly intermixed. During the dot 
probe trials, pairs of pictures were presented in such a way that each of the six 
possible combinations of picture categories were presented equally often and 
that each picture was presented three times in the experiment. Furthermore, the 
location of each possible picture category as well as the location of the dot probe 
were randomized. In sum, there were 24 cells in the design (6 category pairs x 2 
picture locations x 2 probe locations) that were presented three times each. The 
pictures used for the induction task were selected at random (with replacement) 
from the list of available induction stimuli, with the restriction that each possible 
stimulus category (negative or human vs. non-negative or non-human) was pre-
sented equally often throughout the experiment. 
Results 
The analysis was restricted to the data of the dot probe trials. On average, 
participants made few errors (3.46%)1. For the reaction time analysis, we ex-
                                                     
1 The analysis of the attentional bias scores of the error percentages 
yielded no significant results, F(1,41) < 1.6, for all main effects and the two-way 
interaction. 
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cluded trials with errors, and trials with reaction times that differed more than 
2.5 standard deviations from a participant’s mean reaction time in a particular 
condition (2.00%, Ratcliff, 1993). 
We calculated participants’ mean attentional bias scores for negative pic-
tures by subtracting the mean reaction time of the trials in which the probe ap-
peared on the location of a negative picture from the mean reaction time of the 
trials in which the probe appeared on the location of a neutral picture. Because 
the dot probe task is used to measure the attentional competition between a 
neutral and a negative stimulus (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), the calculation of the 
attentional bias scores did not include dot probe trials in which two pictures of 
the same valence were presented. In the same way, we calculated a participant’s 
mean attentional bias towards non-affective stimulus information by subtracting 
the mean reaction time of the trials in which the probe appeared on the location 
of a human picture from the mean reaction time of the trials in which the probe 
appeared on the location of a non-human picture. Trials in which both pictures 
denoted a human or both pictures did not denote a human were not included in 
this calculation (see Table 2, for the mean reaction times).  
A 2 (group: affective vs. non-affective) × 2 (stimulus information: affective 
vs. non-affective) repeated measures ANOVA on the attentional bias scores 
yielded a significant two-way interaction between group and stimulus infor-
mation, F(1,41) = 4.45, p = .041, MSE = 957, f = 0.33. The main effects of group 
and stimulus information were not significant, F(1,41) = 1.52, p = .223, MSE = 
469, and F(1,41) = 1.97, p = .168, MSE = 957, respectively. 
As expected, participants in the affective group reacted faster to the probe 
when it was presented on the location of a negative picture rather than a neutral 
picture, M = 11 ms, F(1,21) = 6.21, p < .05, MSE = 410, d = 0.53. No such effect 
was observed in the non-affective group, M = -9 ms, F(1,20) = 2.21, p = .153, MSE 
= 788, d = 0.32. In contrast to our expectation, however, participants in this 
group did not react faster to the probe when it was on the location of a human 
picture rather than a non-human picture, M = -4 ms, F(1,20) < 1. Instead, there 
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was a tendency for attentional bias to occur toward non-human pictures in the 
affective group, M = -13 ms, F(1,21) = 3.63, p = .070, MSE = 974, d = 0.40. 
Table 2. 
Mean reaction times and SDs (in ms) in Experiment 2, for each stimulus 
information type as a function of group. 
 
Stimulus Dimension 
 
Affective   Non-affective 
Group 
Congruent   Incongruent 
 
Congruent   Incongruent 
M SD   M SD   M SD   M SD 
Affective 452 88 
 
463 101 
 
463 99 
 
450 86 
Non-affective 437 73  428 68  432 63  428 73 
Note. Affectively congruent cells represent trials in which the dot was presented 
on the location in which a negative picture was presented previously. Non-
affectively congruent cells represent trials in which the dot was presented on the 
location in which a human picture was presented previously. 
Discussion 
The aim of the present experiment was to demonstrate that attentional 
biases measured with the dot probe task are modulated by FSAA. We therefore 
asked participants to perform the dot  probe task and encouraged one group of 
participants to selectively attend to affective stimulus information and another 
group to selectively attend to non-affective, semantic stimulus information. 
In line with the FSAA account, the attentional bias towards negative images 
was stronger when participants were encouraged to attend affective stimulus 
information than when they were encouraged to attend to semantic stimulus 
information. Moreover, a significant attentional bias was observed only in the 
former condition. We also investigated the secondary hypothesis that FSAA can 
induce an automatic attentional bias. In contrast with this hypothesis, we did not 
observe a significant attentional bias towards pictures that depicted humans 
when participants were encouraged to attend to stimulus information relevant 
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for the discrimination of humans from non-humans. We are currently in the dark 
as far as a possible explanation for the absence of this effect is concerned. Nev-
ertheless, one should keep in mind that the absence of the effect is a null finding 
that could be due to a lack of statistical power. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Recent studies suggest that automatic affective stimulus processing does 
not occur unconditionally but instead is dependent on FSAA (Everaert et al., 
2011; Spruyt et al., 2007, 2009). We hypothesized that FSAA should affect not 
only affective stimulus processing per se, but also the consequences of affective 
stimulus processing. In this paper we focused on one of these consequences, 
namely attentional bias towards affective stimuli.  
We conducted two experiments in which we intermixed emotional Stroop 
trials (Experiment 1) or dot probe trials (Experiment 2) with induction trials. The 
induction trials were used to encourage one group of participants to selectively 
attend to affective stimulus information (the affective groups) and another group 
to selectively attend to non-affective, semantic stimulus information (the non-
affective groups). In these trials, participants categorized stimuli as “negative” or 
“not negative” in the affective groups, or as “human” or “not human” in the non-
affective groups. 
The results of both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 support the idea that 
attentional bias to negative stimuli depends on FSAA. Emotional Stroop effects 
and dot probe effects for negative stimuli were stronger in the affective groups 
than in the non-affective groups and significant only in the affective groups. 
These results not only provide further evidence for the importance of FSAA in 
automatic affective processing but also reveal that negative stimuli do not draw 
attention in an unconditional manner. Instead, automatic attentional biases for 
negative stimuli depend on the extent to which negative information is currently 
relevant.  
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The data of Experiment 1 further suggested that FSAA can induce atten-
tional bias effects. A significant slowdown in reaction time was observed for 
words that denoted humans when participants were encouraged to attend to 
stimulus information relevant for the discrimination between humans and non-
humans. The results of Experiment 2, however, did not completely parallel the 
results of Experiment 1. In the non-affective group of Experiment 2, no signifi-
cant attentional bias towards humans was observed. At present, we do not have 
a good explanation for these seemingly inconsistent effects except for the possi-
bility that the null finding in Experiment 2 was due to a lack of statistical power.  
Apart from demonstrating the impact of FSAA on automatic attentional 
biases for affective stimuli, the current experiments also conceptually replicated 
and extended earlier findings showing that the task relevance of a stimulus can 
modulate attentional bias. For example, Folk et al. (1992) convincingly demon-
strated that a task relevant stimulus seems to draw attention in a task similar to 
the dot probe paradigm. Furthermore, these effects were also found for complex 
stimuli that were relevant to a person’s current goal (Vogt et al., 2010). However, 
most of these particular effects are highly specific and limited to only those stim-
uli that were actually used in the task itself. We contribute to this line of research 
by applying it to any stimulus that has a task relevant feature. The stimuli on 
which the induction task was performed, were not even used in the emotional 
Stroop task or the dot probe task and vice versa. The effects we observed were 
anything but stimulus specific and thus demonstrated the generality of the im-
pact of FSAA on attentional biases. Moreover, they demonstrate for the first 
time that the relevance of a stimulus feature can automatically bias attention for 
that feature. The latter conclusion should, however, be treated cautiously as we 
did not observe an attentional bias effect for the (relevant) non-affective feature 
in the non-affective condition of Experiment 2.  
Although we found attentional bias to negative stimuli only when FSAA was 
explicitly directed to affective stimulus information, there is ample evidence 
showing that attentional bias effects can be obtained in the absence of explicit 
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manipulations of FSAA too. The question thus arises how one can reconcile these 
findings with our claim that attentional bias effects are critically dependent upon 
FSAA. We see at least two different ways in which attention assignment to affec-
tive stimulus information can occur in the absence of explicit manipulations of 
FSAA. First, the blatant use of affective stimuli might be sufficient to encourage 
participants to attend to affective stimulus information (see Everaert et al., 2011, 
for data supporting this assumption). Second, it is perfectly reasonable to as-
sume that people are chronically inclined to attend to affective stimulus infor-
mation because it has a survival value to do so. Within this framework, atten-
tional bias towards negative stimuli is assumed to occur unless attention is ex-
plicitly directed away from affective stimulus information. So even though FSAA 
might be directed towards affective stimulus information by default, it can be 
shifted flexibly towards other, currently relevant sources of stimulus information. 
Our account predicts that automatic stimulus evaluation of task-irrelevant stim-
ulus sources will not occur under such circumstances. Interestingly, in persons 
with heightened anxiety or clinical anxiety, switching off the automatic stimulus 
evaluation might be more difficult to achieve. 
This latter point is compatible with a bulk of findings showing considerably 
larger attentional biases for negative stimuli in anxious populations (Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007). Note,  however, that our framework makes no predictions whatsoever 
concerning the precise direction of attentional deployment once the affective 
connotation of a stimulus has been processed. For example, some studies have 
shown that acute stress can lead to an attentional bias away rather than towards 
negative stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2010; Wald et al., 2011). Directing attention 
away from a negative stimulus still requires one to process the valence of this 
stimulus first. Our framework concerns the initial stimulus evaluation processes, 
not the subsequent processes that come into play once the valence of a stimulus 
has been established. 
It is important to stress that we do not claim that automatic affective stim-
ulus processing and its consequences are not “truly” automatic. As Moors and De 
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Houwer (2006) pointed out, automaticity is not an all-or-none phenomenon. 
That is, different automaticity features do not always co-occur and should 
therefore be studied independently. It would thus not be warranted to conclude 
that affective processing is non-automatic just because it is dependent on a cer-
tain precondition (i.e., FSAA). We do claim, however, that automatic affective 
stimulus processing and attentional bias for negative stimuli do not occur in an 
unconditional manner but depend on FSAA. 
To summarize, we examined the extent to which automatic attentional 
biases, are modulated by feature-specific attention allocation. Attentional bias 
towards negative stimuli was found under conditions that encouraged partici-
pants to assign attention to affective stimulus information only. In addition, our 
findings suggest that selective attention for particular non-affective stimulus 
information can result in an attentional bias for stimuli that are characterized by 
that feature. We conclude that attentional biases, as consequences of automatic 
(affective) stimulus processing, are fairly malleable and dependent on FSAA. 
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APPENDIX A 
WORDS USED IN EXPERIMENT 1 
Practice words (English translations between brackets) 
Neutral non-human words. raadsel (riddle); populier (poplar); tafel (table). 
Neutral human words. concierge (janitor), inwoner (resident), getuige 
(witness). 
Negative non-human words. marteling (torture); incest (incest); agressie 
(aggression). 
Experimental words (English translations between brackets) 
Neutral non-human words. aardappel (potato); kalender (calendar); 
telefoon (telephone); venster (window); bladzijde (page); klavier (keyboard); 
gebouw (building); bloempot (flowerpot); balpen (ballpoint); programma 
(program); papier (paper); tomaat (tomato); smoking (smoking); trompet 
(trumpet); hazelnoot (hazelnut); achtergrond (background); website (website); 
rugzak (backpack); voetpad (sidewalk); scherm (screen); kassa (cash register); 
trein (train); vliegtuig (airplane); kladblok (scratch-pad). 
Neutral human words. bediende (employee); fietser (cyclist); arbeider 
(workman); burger (civilian); tuinier (gardener); bewoner (inhabitant); spreker 
(speaker); waarnemer (observer); secretaris (secretary); beambte (functionary); 
handelaar (trader); assistent (assistant); bassist (bassist); werknemer (employee); 
reiziger (traveler); chauffeur (driver); bezoeker (visitor); stedeling (townsman); 
aanwezige (person present); bakker (baker); toerist (tourist); leerling (pupil); 
collega (colleague); kassier (cashier). 
Negative non-human words. kakkerlak (cockroach); infectie (infection); 
tandpijn (toothache); braaksel (vomit); gezwel (swelling); misdaad (crime); 
ongeluk (accident); zelfmoord (suicide); geweer (rifle); bommen (bombs); 
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granaat (grenade); tumor (tumor); slachting (slaughtering); kanker (cancer); 
afpersing (extortion); executie (execution); verminking (mutilation); oorlog (war); 
slijm (slime); lijfstraf (corporal punishment); wonde (wound); afval (waste); 
bedrog (deceit); ziekte (illness). 
Negative human words. neonazi (neo-Nazi); dief (thief); racist (racist); 
sadist (sadist); lafaard (coward); dealer (drugs dealer); debiel (moron); pedofiel 
(pedophile); moordenaar (murderer); schizofreen (schizophrenic); gangster 
(gangster); verliezer (loser); tiran (tyrant); vandaal (vandal); egoïst (egoist); 
psychopaat (psychopath); hooligan (hooligan); pestkop (bully); pooier (pimp); 
imbeciel (imbecile); vijand (enemy); leugenaar (liar); verkrachter (rapist); hoer 
(whore). 
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APPENDIX B 
IAPS PICTURES USED IN EXPERIMENT 2 
Practice pictures 
Neutral non-human pictures. 1450, 5660, 7004. 
Neutral human pictures. 2500, 2501, 2560. 
Negative pictures. 1200, 9040, 9622. 
Experimental pictures used in the dot probe task 
Neutral non-human words. 5395, 5535, 5740, 5900, 7002, 7006, 7009, 
7025, 7080, 7211, 7235, 7705. 
Neutral human words. 2190, 2214, 2215, 2372, 2383, 2480, 4250, 4605, 
5875, 7550, 8260, 9070. 
Negative non-human words. 1050, 1052, 1220, 1274, 1300, 6800, 9280, 
9340, 9373, 9561, 9611, 9630. 
Negative human words. 2053, 2120, 2130, 2276, 2750, 2900, 3022, 3300, 
6213, 6250, 8230, 9530. 
Experimental pictures used in the group-specific categorization task 
Neutral non-human pictures. 1670, 5500, 7040, 7190, 7224, 7285, 7491, 
7710. 
Neutral human pictures. 2280, 2385, 2485, 2487, 2570, 2620, 2850, 8465. 
Negative pictures. 1022, 1120, 2692, 7380, 9041, 9290, 9570, 9830. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FEATURE-SPECIFIC ATTENTION OVERRULES AUTOMATIC 
ORIENTING TO EMOTIONAL STIMULI 
1 
 
 
Emotional stimuli are generally thought to be processed in an automatic, 
unconditional fashion. We demonstrate that an unexpected emotional stimulus 
evokes amplitude-variations of the P3a (an ERP marker of automatic attention 
orienting) when attention is directed to emotional stimulus properties but not 
when a non-emotional stimulus feature is attended to. We conclude that 
automatic emotional stimulus processing is dependent on top-down attention 
control mechanisms.  
 
                                                     
1 Based on Everaert, T., Spruyt, A., Rossi, V., Pourtois, G., & De Houwer, J. 
(2012). Feature-specific attention overrules automatic orienting to emotional 
stimuli. Manuscript in preparation. 
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FEATURE-SPECIFIC ATTENTION OVERRULES AUTOMATIC ORIENTING TO  
EMOTIONAL STIMULI 
It is commonly acknowledged that emotional stimuli are processed  in an 
unconditional, bottom-up fashion (Vuilleumier, 2005; Zajonc, 1984). Not only has 
this assumption been corroborated by empirical evidence, it is also an intuitively 
appealing idea as the swift detection of emotionally relevant stimuli is highly 
beneficial to survival. Moreover, this mechanism is thought to be dysfunctional 
or overactive in a wide range of psychopathologies. 
Recent studies suggest, however, that automatic emotional stimulus pro-
cessing critically depends on feature-specific attention allocation (Spruyt, De 
Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 2012; Spruyt, De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009; 
Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007). Specifically, we repeatedly found 
automatic emotional stimulus processing to occur under conditions that provoke 
selective attention to emotional stimulus information only. Conversely, when 
attention was directed to non-emotional semantic stimulus information, clear 
effects of automatic non-emotional stimulus processing emerged whereas au-
tomatic emotional stimulus processing was virtually abolished.  
In these studies, however, emotional stimulus processing was measured at 
the behavioral level only. It thus remains to be seen whether these effects reflect 
a genuine modulation of automatic emotional stimulus processing or merely 
reflect a performance effect instead. To resolve this issue, we examined the im-
pact of feature-specific attention allocation on both automatic emotional and 
non-emotional stimulus processing at the neural level, using EEG measurements. 
We opted to use an oddball study, in which unexpected (deviant) stimuli 
presented in a sequence of expected (standard) stimuli evoke an automatic ori-
enting response, reflected by a fronto-central positive deflection (P3a) peaking 
250-350 ms post-stimulus onset (Hermann & Knight, 2001; Polich, 2007). This 
ATTENTION OVERRULES ORIENTING TO EMOTION 87 
  
P3a deflection seems to be sensitive especially to oddball stimuli that are emo-
tionally different from the standard stimuli (Campanella et al., 2002). 
We advocate, however, that automatic orienting to both unexpected emo-
tional stimuli and unexpected non-emotional stimuli depends on feature-specific 
attention allocation. To test this hypothesis, we used an adaptation of the odd-
ball paradigm in which participants were presented with series of faces of 
middle-aged persons with a neutral facial expression. We refer to these faces as 
standard stimuli. Occasionally, one of four types of deviant stimuli were pre-
sented: middle-aged happy, middle-aged sad, young neutral, and old neutral 
faces. To manipulate attention, participants were asked to respond to one of the 
four types of deviant faces. In the emotion group, the go-stimuli were faces with 
a happy or sad expression. Hence, participants in this group directed their atten-
tion to the emotional nature of the facial expression. In the age group, the go-
stimuli were young or old faces with a neutral expression. This required attention 
allocation to the age of the faces. In each condition, there was one task-relevant 
deviant and two task-irrelevant deviants. A deviant is said to be task-relevant if it 
deviates from the standard stimuli on the same dimension (emotion or age) as 
the go-stimulus. For instance, if the go-stimuli were happy faces, sad faces were 
task-relevant deviants whereas young and old faces were task-irrelevant devi-
ants. 
We predicted that the P3a for task-relevant emotional deviants would be 
bigger than that for task-irrelevant emotional deviants. For instance, the P3a to a 
deviant sad face should be smaller when participants are asked to detect young 
or old faces than when their task is to detect happy faces. Similarly, we predicted  
the automatic processing of non-emotional features to depend on attention allo-
cation too. That is, we expected the P3a for young and old deviant stimuli to be 
larger when they are task-relevant than when they are task-irrelevant. 
Task-relevant deviants evoked a conspicuous positive component that 
reached its  maximal amplitude over medial prefrontal sites 220-400 ms post-
stimulus onset (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). These electrophysiological properties 
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(amplitude, latency, polarity, and topography) are consistent with a genuine P3a 
deflection.  
Figure 1. Grand average waveforms at the Fpz electrode and its 5 surrounding 
electrodes for standard stimuli, emotion deviants, and age deviants in the 
emotion group (a) and the age group (b). 
a) Emotion group 
b) Age group 
Standard 
Emotion Deviant 
Age Deviant 
Time Post-stimulus (in ms) 
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Figure 2. Topographical maps associated with the difference wave at 220-400 
ms, representing the differences between the deviants and the standard faces. 
Conform our prediction, analyses revealed a main effect of task-relevance 
(P = .017) that wasn’t qualified by a two-way interaction with group (P = .996). A 
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task-relevant deviant generated a significant P3a (P = .002) whereas task-
irrelevant deviants did not (P = .49). The absence of the two-way interaction sug-
gested that task-relevance affected automatic orienting to emotional and age 
deviants to the same extent. Crucially, emotional deviants seemed to evoke a 
significant P3a only when they were task-relevant (P < .001), but not when they 
were task-irrelevant (P = .949). Likewise, task-relevant age deviants evoked a 
tendency towards a P3a (P = .129) while task-irrelevant age deviants didn’t (P = 
.303). Additional reference-free topographical analyses based on a conservative 
estimate of the global field strength corroborated this finding (Supplementary 
Results). 
Behavioral results revealed no significant difference in speed (reaction 
times) across groups for the overt detection of the task-relevant deviants. How-
ever, in line with the P3a data, participants did make more false alarms in re-
sponse to task-relevant deviants as compared to task-irrelevant deviants (Sup-
plementary Results).  
Our results provide direct neurophysiological evidence for a strong modu-
lation of automatic emotional stimulus processing by feature-specific attention 
allocation, thus corroborating earlier behavioral studies (Spruyt et al., 2007, 
2009, 2012). While some accounts of emotional processing advocate it is de-
pendent on attention towards the stimulus (Pessoa, 2005), our account implies 
that emotional stimulus processing is critically dependent on attention towards 
specific stimulus dimensions. This framework proposes that the feauture-specific 
direction of attention is of crucial importance but not necessarily cognitive ca-
pacity, spatial attention, or awareness. Specifically, automatic emotional stimu-
lus processing can  take place when little cognitive resources are available and 
even when the stimulus is presented peripherally or subliminally, provided emo-
tional stimulus information is selectively attended to. In line with this account, 
behavioral evidence has been found for subliminal emotional stimulus pro-
cessing when affective stimulus information was selectively attended to (Spruyt 
et al., 2012). 
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SUPPLEMENTARY METHOD SECTION 
Participants 
Thirty-three volunteers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were 
paid € 20 to participate in this study. Six subjects were excluded from the 
analyses because their error percentages exceeded 20% in at least 1 cell of the 
design. The final sample therefore consisted of 27 participants (Mage = 21.8 years, 
5 males, 2 left-handed). 
Stimuli and Materials 
Facegen software (http://www.facegen.com) was used to create artificial 
faces and controlled variations of these faces. We randomly generated 32 faces, 
of which 5 variations were created: a neutral, 43-year-old face; a sad, 43-year-old 
face; a happy, 43-year-old face; a neutral, 15-year-old face; and a neutral, 65 
year-old-face (for an illustration, see Supplementary Figure 1). 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. Selection of 2 faces used in this study, with their 
corresponding variations in emotion and age. 
Consequently, the faces presented in the experiment could either be standard, 
happy, sad, young, or old. We thus used 160 different pictures of faces as stimuli. 
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The settings used to generate the variations of the faces were piloted to ensure 
that the differences between the standard faces and the deviant faces were as 
comparable as possible. The pictures of the face stimuli measured 235 × 215 px, 
and were presented in the center of a 19-inch CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 
100 Hz and a resolution of 800 × 600 px. 
Procedure 
Participants were seated in a dimly-lit room and were randomly assigned 
to one of two between-subjects conditions. Participants in the Emotion Group (n 
= 13) read instructions stating that the experiment aimed at investigating emo-
tion perception, while participants in the Age Group (n = 14) read instructions 
that revealed the aim of the experiment to be the investigation of age percep-
tion. They were asked to press the space bar with their dominant hand whenever 
a relevant face appeared. Within each block only one of the two emotions in the 
Emotion Group and one of the two ages in the Age Group required a response. 
After reading the instructions, participants performed 2 training blocks of 
20 trials each, and 12 experimental blocks of 100 trials each. The stimuli pre-
sented in each block consisted of 80% standard faces, while the other face types 
were presented 5% of all times. A subset of the faces was assigned to each block, 
these subsets were the same for each participant. For each training block, one of 
the 32 randomly generated faces and its variations were used. In the ex-
perimental blocks, 5 faces of the 32-face stimulus set were used together with 
their variations. 
A trial consisted of the central presentation of a face that remained on 
screen until a response was given or 1500 ms elapsed. Afterwards, an inter-trial 
interval was initiated that varied randomly between 300 ms and 600 ms. 
EEG acquisition and statistical analysis 
Participants were fitted with an elastic cap to allow for the recording of the 
EEG through 128 Ag/AgCl electrodes that were distributed according to the Bio-
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Semi ABCD positioning system (Biosemi Active Two System, 
http://www.biosemi.com). The signal was referenced online to a CMS-DRL 
ground which drives the subject’s average potential as close as possible to the 
reference voltage of the amplifier (i.e. the amplifier zero). Additionally, 2 elec-
trodes linking the mastoids were used to reference the data off line and 4 elec-
trodes served to monitor vertical and horizontal eye movements. EEGs were dig-
itized at 512 Hz and were band-pass filtered off line between 0.016 and 70 Hz. 
An additional notch filter centered around 50 Hz reduced AC interference. 
Off line computations were performed with Brain Vision Analyzer 2.0 (Brain 
Products, GmbH, Munich, Germany). Segmentation was performed relative to 
stimulus onset with an interval ranging from 100 ms before to 1500 ms after 
stimulus onset. We corrected for eye-blink artifacts using the standard algorithm 
of Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1983). Each segment was baseline corrected to 
the 100 ms pre-stimulus onset interval. Residual artifacts were semi-
automatically detected with a ± 75 μV criterion relative to the baseline, after 
which their segments were deleted. Grand average waveforms were calculated 
separately for each Stimulus Type (standard face vs. emotionally deviant face vs. 
age deviant face) of each Group (Emotion vs. Age).  
Based on visual inspection and previous research (a.o. Polich, 2007), the 
P3a component was identified as the most positive peak that occurred between 
220 and 400 ms post-stimulus and was maximal on prefrontal sites. The P3b was 
defined as a positive peak occurring between 400 and 800 ms after stimulus on-
set that was maximally on parietal sites. Difference scores were calculated by 
subtracting the mean amplitudes of the average waveform associated with the 
standard faces from the mean amplitude of the average waveform associated 
with the other face types (emotionally deviant faces or age deviant faces that 
could or could not be task relevant). These scores were used as dependent 
variables in the subsequently performed repeated measures ANOVAs and t-tests. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS 
Behavioral Results 
Reaction-time data were analyzed after exclusion of outlying latencies 
(3.3%). Cut-off boundaries were defined as being 2.5 standard deviations above 
and below the participants mean latency in a particular condition (Ratcliff, 1993). 
The following reaction-time analysis revealed no significant effects 
(Supplementary Table 1). 
An analysis of the number of correctly identified target faces (see Supple-
mentary Table 1) revealed that participants made more correct identifications 
for sad target faces than for happy target faces, t(13) = 2.38, p < .05, d = 0.66. No 
other differences with regard to the number of correct hits reached significance, 
all t’s < 1.65.  
Supplementary Table 1. 
Mean RTs (in ms), Percentage misses, and respective SDs to target faces. 
 
Group 
 
Emotion 
 
Age 
 
Happy 
 
Sad 
 
Young 
 
Old 
Dependent variable M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
Response latencies 674 69 
 
689 68 
 
677 74 
 
671 68 
Percentage misses 7.6 4.8  2.6 4.3  5 3.6  5 4.8 
 
A 2 (group: emotion vs. age) × 2 (dimension: emotion vs. age) × 2 (face 
type: young or sad vs. old or happy) repeated measures ANOVA on the partici-
pants’ false alarm rates (Supplementary Table 2) revealed a significant main ef-
fect of dimension, F(1,25) = 5.76, p < .05, MSE = 0.08, f = 0.48, indicating more 
false alarms were made to emotional deviants. Importantly, a significant interac-
tion between condition and dimension showed that more false alarms were 
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made towards task-relevant deviants than to task-irrelevant deviants, F(1,25) = 
12.76, p < .01, MSE = 0.08, f = 0.71. 
Supplementary Table 2. 
Percentages (and SDs) of false alarms for each deviant type for each 
group 
 
Dimension 
 
Emotion 
 
Age 
 
Happy 
 
Sad 
 
Young 
 
Old 
Group M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
Emotion 4.1 3.1 
 
3.6 4.8 
 
0.3 1 
 
0.6 1.9 
Age 1.9 1.3  0.1 0.4  2.3 4.6  1 1.6 
 
ERP Results 
Inspection of the averaged epochs revealed a peak that occurred roughly 
between 220 ms and 400 ms post-stimulus and was maximal on prefrontal sites. 
The location in time and space of this peak, relative to the later and more parie-
tal P3b component, suggests that this peak corresponds to the P3a. Further anal-
yses were restricted to the electrode that corresponded to C17/Fpz and its sur-
rounding 5 electrodes. Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the 
mean amplitudes that corresponded to standard stimuli from the mean ampli-
tudes that corresponded to the faces that deviated in age or emotion. A 2 
(group: emotion vs. age) × 2 (deviant type: emotion vs. age) repeated measures 
ANOVA on these scores yielded a significant interaction, F(1,25) = 6.61, p = .017, 
MSE = 2.48, f = 0.51. This interaction indicated that task-relevant deviant faces 
produced a significant P3a, F(1,25) = 12.62, p = .002, MSE = 4.62, d = 0.28, while 
task-irrelevant deviant faces did not, F < 1. The same pattern of results emerged 
when peak amplitudes were used as dependent variables in the ANOVA. Again, a 
significant interaction was obtained, F(1,25) = 5.52, p = .027, MSE = 3.74, f = 0.47, 
showing greater peak amplitudes for task-relevant deviant faces than task-
irrelevant deviant faces. Emotional deviants evoked a significant P3a when they 
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were task relevant, F(1,12) = 21.94, p = .0005, MSE = 1.88, d = 1.30, but not when 
they are task-irrelevant, F < 1. Concurrently, there was a tendency for age 
deviants to evoke a P3a when they were task-relevant, F(1,13) = 2.63, p = .128, 
MSE = 7.15, d = 0.43, that was not present when they were task-irrelevant, 
F(1,13) = 1.16, p = .303, MSE = 5.20, d = .30. Similar effects were found on the 
P3b, which was defined as the peak residing on parietal sites between 400 ms 
and 800 ms after stimulus onset (see Supplementary Figure 2). 
 
Supplementary Figure 2. Grand average waveforms at the Pz electrode and its 5 
surrounding, more posterior electrodes for standard faces, emotion deviants, and 
age deviants for the emotion group (a), and the age group (b). 
a) Emotion group 
b) Age group 
Standard 
Emotion Deviant 
Age Deviant 
Time Post-stimulus (in ms) 
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Analyses on the P3b were restricted to 6 electrodes (A19/Pz and its 5 sur-
rounding, more posterior electrodes) and difference scores were calculated the 
same way they were calculated when analyzing the P3a. A 2 (group: emotion vs. 
age) × 2 (deviant type: emotion vs. age) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a 
significant interaction between the 2 factors only, F(1,25) = 48.49, p < .0001, MSE 
= 7.12, f = 1.39. All deviants evoked a significant P3b, all F’s > 4.69. However, the 
P3b amplitude was higher for task-relevant deviants than for task-irrelevant de-
viants, both for emotional deviants and age deviants, F(1,25) = 28.21, p < .0001, 
MSE = 6.42, d = 1.42 , and F(1,25) = 13.95, p < .001, MSE = 11.77, d = 2.07, re-
spectively. 
In a following step we performed a topographical analysis using the Cartool 
program (http://brainmapping.unige.ch/cartool) on the EEG data. The grand av-
erage EEG waves were segmented into a small number of topographical maps by 
means of the K-means clustering algorithm. When the clustering algorithm was 
limited to the temporal interval in which the P3a occurred, a 3-map-solution (see 
Supplementary Figure 3 and 4) emerged that explained 95.80% of the total vari-
ance and was considered the best possible trade-off between data reduction and 
variance accounted for. Visual inspection suggested map 3 to be related to the 
P3a due to its topography, marked by relatively more frontal positivity than the 
other maps (see Supplementary Figure 3). In a subsequent step the maps were 
fitted back to the individual subjects’ data. When the Global Field Power (GFP) of 
the fitted maps was entered in a 2 (group: emotion vs. age) × 2 (map: map 2 vs. 
map 3) × 2 (deviant: emotion vs. age) repeated measures ANOVA, a significant 
three-way interaction between group, map and deviant was observed, F(1,25) = 
5.14, p = .032, MSE = .01, f = 0.61. When broken down across maps, a significant 
two-way interaction between group and deviant was observed for Map 3 only, 
F(1,25) = 15.90, p < .001, MSE = 0.73, f = 0.78. This interaction revealed that the 
mean GFP was higher for task-relevant deviants than for task-irrelevant deviants. 
This difference was confirmed at the dimension-specific level of the deviants 
albeit marginally significant, F(1,25) = 2.91, p = .101, MSE = 1.82, d = 0.66, for 
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emotional deviants, and F(1,25) = 3.03, p = .094, MSE = 2.10, d = 0.67, for age 
deviants . No such interaction was found upon inspection of Map 2, F < 1. 
 
Supplementary Figure 3. The maps that were extracted using Cartool 
(http://brainmapping.unige.ch/cartool). 
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Supplementary Figure 4. The temporal distribution of the extracted maps and 
their associated Global Field Power. 
a) Emotion group 
b) Age group 
Standard 
Standard 
Emotion Deviant 
Age Deviant 
Emotion Deviant 
Age Deviant 
Map 1 Map 2 Map 3 
Time Post-stimulus (in ms) 
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FEATURE-SPECIFIC ATTENTION ALLOCATION AFFECTS 
EMOTIONAL STIMULUS REPRESENTATIONS: 
A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 1 
 
 
Previous studies demonstrated that automatic affective stimulus processing 
occurs only when affective stimulus information is attended to. In these studies, 
however, no manipulation checks were employed in which feature-specific 
attention allocation was measured directly. Our aim was to validate a method 
that allows for the measurement of the degree to which different stimulus 
dimensions are attended to. To this end, we encouraged participants to attend to 
different stimulus dimensions while they performed a similarity judgment task 
that allowed for the modeling of the attention weights that participants assign to 
different stimulus dimensions. In accordance with the framework of feature-
specific attention allocation, participants who were encouraged to selectively 
attend to the affective stimulus dimension increased the salience of this 
dimension whereas participants that were encouraged to selectively attend to a 
non-affective stimulus dimension were found to increase the salience of this 
particular dimension.  
                                                     
1 Based on Everaert, T., Spruyt, A., & De Houwer, J. (2012). Feature-specific 
attention allocation affects emotional stimulus representations: A multi-
dimensional scaling approach. Manuscript in preparation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is generally assumed that humans are endowed with a mechanism that 
allows them to evaluate all incoming stimulus information in an unconditional, 
automatic fashion (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Bartlett, 1932; Lazarus, 1966; Wundt, 
1907; Zajonc, 1980, 1984). A vast body of research has confirmed this intuitively 
appealing assumption: affective stimulus processing has been shown to draw 
upon fast-acting and efficient processes (Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001; 
Hermans, Crombez, & Eelen, 2000; also see Klauer & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007), 
even in the absence of  conscious identification of the instigating stimulus 
(Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996) or an explicit 
evaluative processing goal (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996). 
Recent studies conducted at our lab suggest, however, that automatic 
affective stimulus processing depends strongly on feature-specific attention allo-
cation (FSAA; Spruyt, De Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 2012; Spruyt, Hermans, 
& De Houwer, 2009; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2007). According to 
this framework, automatic affective processing of task-irrelevant stimuli is ex-
pected to occur if and to the extent that selective attention is directed towards 
affective stimulus features. In contrast, when attention is directed to other, non-
affective semantic stimulus features, automatic affective processing of task-
irrelevant stimuli is assumed to be reduced. Instead, enhanced processing of the 
stimulus features that participants do attend to is expected to occur. 
Consider, for example, the findings of Spruyt et al. (2009). They manipu-
lated FSAA while measuring automatic affective stimulus processing with a vari-
ant of the affective priming paradigm (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 
1986). In this paradigm, participants were asked to pronounce affectively 
polarized target words (e.g. Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996). Each 
target word was preceded by the short presentation of a task-irrelevant, affec-
tively polarized prime word. Automatic affective processing of the prime stimu-
lus is said to have taken place if task performance is influenced by the affective 
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congruence between the prime and the target. Specifically, task performance is 
expected to be better when the prime and the target belong to the same affec-
tive category (e.g. “sunshine” and “kitten”) than when they do not (e.g. 
“murderer” and “kitten”). Spruyt et al. (2009) presented participants with a mix-
ture of these affective priming trials with other affective priming trials that re-
quired either affective or non-affective semantic categorization of the target 
words. These trials were used to encourage participants to selectively attend to a 
given stimulus feature and will henceforth be called induction trials. During these 
induction trials, one group of participants (the affective group) was asked to cat-
egorize target stimuli as either positive or negative, whereas another group of 
participants (the non-affective group) was asked to categorize target stimuli as 
either referring to humans or to objects. The experimental context thus per-
suaded the affective group to selectively attend to affective stimulus infor-
mation. The non-affective group, on the other hand, was persuaded to selec-
tively attend to semantic stimulus information relevant for the discrimination 
between humans and objects. In line with the FSAA framework, effects of auto-
matic affective stimulus processing (i.e., affective priming of naming responses) 
were found in the affective group but not in the non-affective group. In contrast, 
effects of automatic semantic stimulus processing were found in the non-
affective group but not in the affective group (i.e., priming of the human and 
object categories). 
Several studies further corroborated these results. For instance, Spruyt, De 
Houwer, Everaert, and Hermans (2012) demonstrated that even unconscious 
affective stimulus processing is dependent upon FSAA as well. Moreover, 
Everaert, Spruyt, and De Houwer (2011) further broadened the scope of the 
FSAA account showing that subtle cues, such as the proportion of affective 
stimuli in the experiment, can be sufficient to encourage participants to selec-
tively attend to affective stimulus information. 
In addition, Everaert, Spruyt, and De Houwer (2012) reasoned that FSAA 
should affect not only automatic affective stimulus processing per se, but also 
the processes that are assumed to take place once the evaluation of a certain 
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stimulus has been established. It is well-known, for example, that affective stim-
uli capture attention, an effect dubbed “attentional bias” (for a review, see Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzerdoorn, 2007). Given 
that an attentional bias is contingent upon affective stimulus processing, 
Everaert et al. predicted automatic attentional biases for affective stimulus ma-
terials to depend on FSAA as well. In line with their expectations, they observed 
an attentional bias towards affective stimuli only when participants selectively 
attended to affective stimulus information. Moreover, when participants selec-
tively attended to non-affective semantic information, they observed an atten-
tional bias towards such non-affective semantic stimuli only. 
Taken as a whole, these findings are certainly consistent with the 
hypothesis that variations in FSAA were the driving force behind the effects ob-
tained. In none of these studies, however, was FSAA assessed directly. That is, 
the efficacy of the FSAA manipulations was simply inferred from the fact that 
indices of automatic affective stimulus processing (i.e., affective priming and 
attentional bias) were clearly affected by the experimental conditions. No inde-
pendent measures of FSAA were administered and we therefore cannot be sure 
as to whether previously employed manipulations truly affected FSAA. As an in-
dependent measure of FSAA could provide us with a manipulation check, such a 
measure would further corroborate the abovementioned studies. To our 
knowledge, however, the number of methods that is readily available to measure 
the deployment of feature-specific attention is quite limited. 
One method that can be used to achieve such an assessment of FSAA is the 
INDSCAL algorithm, a variant of multidimensional scaling (Carroll & Chang, 1970; 
Carroll & Wish, 1974). This algorithm allows for the derivation of a multi-
dimensional space on the basis of similarity judgments of pairs of stimuli. The 
stimulus dimensions of the space correspond to the different stimulus features 
that can be selectively attended to (e.g. Figure 1a).  
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING  107 
  
 
Figure 1. Illustration of a multidimensional representation of 9 face images. A) A 
hypothetical representation that is common to all subjects. B) The weight space 
that indicates the weights for two hypothetical subjects. Subject 1 adds greater 
weight to the emotion dimension while Subject 2 adds greater weight to the age 
dimension. C) The private space of Subject 1 is the product of the common 
representation with the weights Subject 1 assigned to the dimensions. In this 
case, the emotion dimension stretches and the age dimension shrinks. D) The 
private space of Subject 2. Here, the age dimension is stretched while the 
emotion dimension shrunk. 
FSAA acts on this representation by weighting the dimensions of the space 
according to its direction and strength. Stimulus dimensions that are selectively 
attended to receive greater weight, get stretched out, and become more salient. 
108  CHAPTER 4 
In contrast, stimulus dimensions that do not receive selective attention receive 
little weight, get shrunken, and become less salient. The INDSCAL algorithm 
yields parameters that reflect this differential weighting (e.g. Figure 1b-1d). 
Fazio and Dunton (1997) provided an indication for the viability of this 
method in research on affective stimulus processing. They demonstrated that 
indices of racial bias, as measured with the affective priming paradigm, were 
correlated with the weights the participants assigned to the stimulus dimension 
related to race. As a racial bias is, in essence, an evaluation of a race, one can 
presume this correlation to hold for affective stimulus processing and feature-
specific attention in general as well. Deutsch and Fazio (2008) further used 
INDSCAL to show that FSAA is a crucial mechanism involved in subtyping 
(Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Taylor, 1981). This phenomenon occurs when one is 
confronted with an exemplar of a certain stereotyped group that is, somehow, 
atypical for it (e.g. an introverted lead guitarist). Rather than changing the 
stereotype to fit the atypical exemplar, people generally create a new category, 
or subtype, for the exemplar, leaving the original stereotype unchanged. Deutsch 
and Fazio (2008) observed that when a group of atypical exemplars cluster to-
gether because of a common feature, people will add greater weight to the 
stimulus dimension related to this feature in order to separate the stereotyped 
group from the subtype. INDSCAL has also been applied in emotion research, 
with Halberstadt and Niedenthal (1997) showing that persons in an emotional 
state weight the emotional stimulus dimension more heavily than persons in a 
neutral state. 
In the current study, we set out to assess the deployment of feature-
specific attention with INDSCAL in a design similar to the one employed by 
Spruyt et al. (2009, 2012) and Everaert et al. (2012). We investigated this by pre-
senting participants with a random mix of two kinds of trials, similarity judgment 
trials and induction trials. During the similarity judgment trials, participants were 
presented with pairs of faces that were taken from the stimulus set depicted in 
Figure 1. Participants were asked to judge the similarity of each face pair to ob-
tain estimates of psychological distance, which were used for the reconstruction 
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of the stimulus space and the idiosyncratic attention weights. The induction trials 
were used to encourage participants to selectively attend to a given stimulus 
dimension. During these trials, one group of participants (the emotion group) 
was asked to categorize faces according to the emotion they portray whereas 
another group (the age group) was asked to categorize faces according to the 
age they displayed. We hypothesized that the emotion group would add greater 
weight to the emotional stimulus dimension compared to the age dimension. 
Conversely, the age group was hypothesized to add greater weight to the age 
dimension than to the emotion dimension. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty-eight undergraduate students (Mage = 18.6 years, 25 males and 3 
females) participated in the experiment for course credit. One participant was 
excluded from further analyses because of manifest unwillingness to comply 
with the instructions. 
Materials 
Different stimulus sets were generated for the similarity judgment task and 
the induction task. The different faces were created artificially using FaceGen 
Modeller 3.5 (http://www.facegen.com), a software tool that allows for 
controlled manipulations of different face images. We used it to systematically 
manipulate the age and emotional expression of computer-generated faces. 
The similarity judgment set (see Figure 1a) consisted of nine images that 
were variations of one base face. These faces reflected combinations of two pos-
sible stimulus dimensions: emotion and age. With regard to the emotion dimen-
sions, a face could either have a sad expression, a neutral expression, or a happy 
expression. With regard to the age dimension, a face could either look young (ca. 
15 years old), middle-aged (ca. 40 years old), or old (ca. 60 years old). Combining 
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the two stimulus dimensions thus resulted in 9 (3 × 3) possible faces, which were 
all used and depicted in Figure 1. Extensive piloting ensured both stimulus di-
mensions were approximately equally salient. Across different pilot studies, we 
systematically varied the salience of the stimulus dimensions until a sufficiently 
adequate multidimensional representation could be obtained. 
To construct the induction set, we used nine different middle-aged faces 
with a neutral expression that were randomly generated by the Facegen 
program. The parameters used to create the similarity judgment set were used 
to create four variations of each of these nine faces: a sad version, a happy ver-
sion, a young version, and an old version. These variations were used to com-
prise the induction set that thus consisted of a total of 36 face images (9 × 4). 
Additionally, a practice set was created for the practice of the induction 
task. This set was constructed in the same way as the categorization set, but was 
created from eight randomly generated faces. The eventual practice set thus 
consisted of 32 face images (8 × 4). 
All face images had a width of 135 px and a height of 130 px. In addition, 
we created an image to use as a backward mask and a forward mask for the pre-
viously described face images. This image represented random noise and meas-
ured 250 × 250 px. 
All images were presented on the black background of a 19 inch screen 
with a resolution of 1024 × 768 px and a refresh rate of 100 Hz. The experiment 
was controlled with a computer with an Intel D930 (3.2 GHz) processor through 
an Affect 4.0 program (Spruyt, Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 
2010). The computer’s parallel port was connected to a voice key that recorded 
the responses during the induction trials. Responses during the similarity judg-
ment trials were recorded with a standard AZERTY keyboard. 
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Procedure 
We tested all participants in a dimly lit room and randomly assigned them 
to either the Emotion group (n = 13) or the Age group (n = 14). They were seated 
in front of the screen that displayed the instructions, showing them how to per-
form the different trials. The experimenter clarified the instructions when neces-
sary. 
An induction trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross in the 
center of the screen. After an interval of 500 ms, the fixation cross was erased 
and replaced by the masking image for 200 ms. This mask was immediately fol-
lowed by the 500-ms presentation of a face image, after which the mask was 
shown again for another 200 ms. Participants in the Emotion group were asked 
to vocally categorize the shortly presented face images as either “happy” or 
“sad”, whereas participants in the Age group were asked to vocally categorize 
them as being either “young” or “old”. The experimenter manually coded the 
response afterwards and initiated an inter-trial interval that varied randomly 
between 500 ms and 1500 ms. 
 The similarity judgment trials also started with the 500-ms presentation 
of a fixation cross in the center of the screen. But afterwards, two mask images 
were presented directly next to each other in the middle of the screen for 
another 200 ms. The masks were replaced by two different face images that 
were presented for 500 ms and were ca. 115 pixels apart. The faces were then 
replaced by the masks which were presented for the same duration and in the 
same location as the first masks. Participants were asked to rate the similarity of 
the two faces on a four-point scale using the keyboard. The similarity scale 
ranged from very similar (‘x’) and slightly similar (‘v’), to slightly different (‘n’) 
and very different (‘;’). As to avoid any confusion with the pressing of the keys, 
participants were requested to keep their fingers on these keys during the 
course of the experiment. They were asked to base their judgment on all 
possible differences they could distinguish, and to not just focus on one feature 
only. 
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 For all trial types, participants were asked to respond within 2 seconds, or 
the trial would end with a 300-ms visual message that informed them that they 
were too slow (“!!!TE TRAAG!!!”). 
Participants first performed a block of 32 practice trials consisting of 
induction trials only. Participants in the Emotion group performed this task on 
the 8 sad and 8 happy practice face images. Participants in the Age group per-
formed this task on the 8 young and 8 old practice face images. Each of these 
images was presented twice throughout the practice phase. 
 Afterwards, an experimental block of 144 trials was performed that con-
tained 72 induction trials and 72 similarity judgment trials that were randomly 
intermixed. The Emotion group performed the induction task on the 9 happy and 
9 sad faces whereas the Age group performed the induction task on the 9 young 
and 9 old faces. Within each group, each image was presented 4 times, leading 
to a total of 72 induction trials. For the 72 similarity judgment trials, every 
possible pairing (36 pairs) of the 9 faces in the similarity judgment stimulus set 
was presented twice each. The position of each face in the pair presentation was 
chosen at random. 
RESULTS 
The stimulus space was created on the basis of the similarity judgment 
data. For each participant, a dissimilarity matrix was created that represented 
the dissimilarities of the 36 possible face pairs. In the next step, these data were 
entered into SPSS 15.0 (SPSS, Inc., 1990) and were subjected to INDSCAL, which 
is part of the ALSCAL procedure in the program. 
The data of two participants were removed as their dissimilarity matrices 
conflicted heavily with those of the other participants, suggesting they might 
have reversed the scale. Consequently, their S-stress value, a measure of error in 
ALSCAL, exceeded our outlier criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the 
mean. We performed the INDSCAL algorithm (Carroll & Chang, 1970; Carroll & 
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Wish, 1974) on the data of the remaining 25 participants. The algorithm itera-
tively improved a random representation until a convergence criterion was 
reached that indicated the decrease in S-stress was negligible (below .0001). As 
the stimuli we used in the study varied only on two possible stimulus dimensions, 
we decided to constrain the solution to this number of dimensions (see Figure 2, 
for the eventual representation. 
The INDSCAL procedure reached the preset convergence criterion after 10 
iterations. The final representation had an S-stress of .27 and explained, on aver-
age, 73.4 % of a participant’s variance. Figure 2a shows a representation of the 
common stimulus space, the multidimensional representation common for all 
subjects. The dimensions of this common space clearly correspond to the emo-
tion dimension and the age dimension. However, the emotionally neutral faces 
seem to cluster together with the sad faces, which might reflect an anchoring 
effect (Scherer & Lambert, 2009). 
The distribution of the weights (Figure 2b) shows that the Emotion group 
and the Age group differentially weight the two stimulus dimensions. The means 
displayed in Table 1 clearly confirm that participants in the Emotion group assign 
greater weight to the emotion dimension than to the age dimension, while the 
participants in the Age group assign greater weight to the age dimension than to 
the emotion dimension. It is not common practice, however, to perform statisti-
cal tests on these individual dimension weights (Jones, 1983; MacCallum, 1977). 
We performed the analysis on the “flattened subject weights”, which reflect the 
weight ratios (Rodgers, 1985; Schiffman, Reynolds, & Young, 1981; Young, 1982). 
A positive flattened weight indicates dominance of the emotion dimension over 
the age dimension, while a negative flattened weight indicates dominance of the 
age dimension over the emotion dimension. 
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Figure 2. The multidimensional representations extracted from the participants’ 
similarity judgments. A) The common space representing the 9 face images. B) 
The weight space showing the distributions of the participants’ weights. Points 
marked with an ‘E’ represent participants in the Emotion group. Points marked 
with an ‘A’ represent participants in the Age group. C) The private space 
associated with the mean weights of the Emotion group. D) The private space 
associated with the mean weights of the Age group. 
In line with our hypothesis, the flattened subject weights of the Emotion 
group and the Age group were significantly different, t(23) = 2.27, p < .05, d = 
0.94. This difference suggests that there are group differences in the allocation 
of selective attention. In the Emotion group, the emotion dimension was at-
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tended to more than the age dimension. In the Age group, the age dimension 
was attended to more than the emotion dimension. 
Table 1. 
Mean dimension weights, flattened weights and their respective standard 
deviations, as a function of group. Positive flattened subject weights 
indicate a greater weighting of the emotion dimension than the age 
dimension. Negative flattened subject weights indicate a greater weighting 
of the age dimension than the emotion dimension. 
 
Stimulus dimension 
   
 
Emotion 
 
Age 
 
Flattened weight 
Group M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
Emotion .68 .20 
 
.54 .19 
 
.44 .90 
Age .42 .21 
 
.67 .20 
 
-.41 .98 
DISCUSSION 
In contrast with the popular belief that humans are capable of evaluating 
all incoming stimuli, recent studies have shown that automatic affective stimulus 
processing is not as unconditional as previously assumed (Everaert et al., 2012; 
Spruyt et al. 2007, 2009, 2012). These studies suggested that automatic affective 
stimulus processing will occur only when selective attention is directed to affec-
tive stimulus information. When selective attention is directed to any other 
source of stimulus information, automatic affective stimulus processing does not 
take place, but rather enhanced processing of the non-affective stimulus infor-
mation that is selectively attended to. This framework can be conceptualized by 
representing perceived stimuli in a psychological, multidimensional space with 
dimensions corresponding to various stimulus features. FSAA acts on this repre-
sentation by stretching those dimensions that are selectively attended to and 
shrinking those dimensions that do not receive selective attention. 
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In the studies corroborating this account, however, FSAA was never meas-
ured independently and no manipulation checks were administered. We there-
fore set out to develop a method that would allow for the measurement of FSAA 
through its effects on the abovementioned multidimensional space. Such a 
method would allow us to further validate earlier studies, showing that manipu-
lations employed in these studies truly affected FSAA. Furthermore, the multi-
dimensional scaling method could be used in future studies as a manipulation 
check. 
In one study, we presented participants with two, randomly intermixed 
tasks. First, a categorization task was used to encourage participants to attend to 
either the affective stimulus dimension or a non-affective stimulus dimension. 
Second, a similarity judgment task was used to obtain the psychological 
similarities of pairs of stimuli. These similarity judgments could be used to recon-
struct a multidimensional representation of the participants’ psychological 
stimulus space. In accordance with our predictions, participants attached a 
greater attentional weight to those stimulus dimensions that were hypothesized 
to be attended to. Participants that were encouraged to selectively attend to 
emotional features added greater weight to the emotion dimension than to the 
age dimension. In contrast, participants that were encouraged to selectively at-
tend to age-related features added greater weight to the age dimension than to 
the emotion dimension. 
Measures of FSAA thus proved to be sensitive to a manipulation similar to 
the one employed by Spruyt et al. (2007, 2009, 2012) and Everaert et al. (2012). 
This finding further corroborates these studies, indicating that FSAA, in all likeli-
hood, was the crucial factor at play in these studies. This measure can be used as 
a manipulation check in future studies as well. Furthermore, measures of FSAA 
might prove fruitful in the future to show a more linear dependency of automatic 
affective stimulus processing on FSAA. 
We hope to test this in the future with a design in which we mix similarity 
judgment trials with affective priming trials wherein the naming task is used. 
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Similar to Fazio and Dunton’s (1997) studies, we hypothesize the weights partici-
pants assigned to the affective stimulus dimension are correlated with partici-
pants’ affective priming indices. Furthermore, we expect both indices to be sen-
sitive to a manipulation of FSAA. We can manipulate FSAA much the same way as 
Everaert et al. (2011) did, by embedding the affective priming trials in a context 
of either other affective priming trials (affective group) or neutral priming trials 
(non-affective group). The context of affective stimuli in the affective group will 
encourage the group to selectively attend to the affective stimulus dimensions 
whereas the context of neutral stimuli in the non-affective group will not. Con-
sequently, the INDSCAL algorithm would yield larger attention weights for the 
affective stimulus dimension in the affective group compared to the non-
affective group. In turn, these attention weights should correlate significantly 
with the obtained affective priming indices across conditions. 
The use of MDS could prove fruitful in more applied contexts of research 
on affective stimulus processing as well. More specifically, measures of affective 
stimulus processing have been used to measure personal preferences and atti-
tudes (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009; Fazio & Olson, 
2003). The dependency of automatic affective stimulus processing on FSAA can 
potentially hamper the predictive validity of such measures. If the attitude and 
the to-be-predicted behavior are assessed under different circumstances of 
FSAA, the predictive validity of the attitude measure could be severely de-
creased. Perhaps taking attention weights into account could increase the 
validity of measures of attitudes. 
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 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
As early as the beginning of the previous century, several authors advo-
cated the hypothesis that humans are capable of evaluating all incoming stimulus 
information in an unconditional, automatic fashion (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Bartlett, 
1932; Lazarus, 1966; Wundt, 1907; Zajonc, 1980, 1984). Experimental support for 
this idea has grown steadily over the last decades, both in the behavioral 
sciences and the neurosciences. Recent research, however, suggests that auto-
matic affective stimulus processing is not unconditional but depends on feature-
specific attention allocation (FSAA; Spruyt, De Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 
2012; Spruyt, De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009; Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & 
Eelen, 2007). According to this framework, automatic affective stimulus pro-
cessing will occur only to the extent that affective stimulus information is selec-
tively attended to. Furthermore, automatic processing of non-affective semantic 
stimulus features is also assumed to depend on the extent to which non-affective 
semantic stimulus information is attended to.  
Spruyt et al. (2007, 2009, 2012) provided support for this framework using 
affective priming of naming responses as a marker for automatic affective stim-
ulus processing. In the affective priming paradigm, naming responses towards 
affectively polarized target stimuli are generally faster and more accurate when 
the target stimuli are preceded by affectively congruent prime stimuli than when 
the targets are preceded by affectively incongruent prime stimuli (e.g. Bargh, 
Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996). This effect can occur only if the affective 
value of the prime stimulus has been processed and can therefore be exploited 
as a marker for affective stimulus processing. In several studies, these naming 
trials were presented together with categorization trials aimed at encouraging 
participants to selectively attend either to affective stimulus information or non-
affective semantic stimulus information. During these categorization trials,  one 
group of participants (the affective group) was asked to categorize target stimuli 
as either positive or negative, whereas another group of participants (the non-
affective group) was asked to categorize target stimuli as either humans or ob-
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jects. In accordance with the framework of FSAA, reliable affective priming of 
naming responses was observed in the affective group only. Conversely, cate-
gorical semantic priming effects were found in the non-affective group only. In 
this group, naming responses were faster when the prime and target stimulus 
belonged to the same semantic category (e.g. both prime and target referring to 
a human) than when they did not (e.g. a prime referring to an object and a target 
referring to a human). Such effects of FSAA were consistently found in several 
studies and persisted even when primes were presented subliminally (Spruyt et 
al., 2007, 2009, 2012). 
Automatic affective stimulus processing thus depends on the extent to 
which affective stimulus information is selectively attended to. The framework of 
FSAA implies several additional predictions that were tested over the course of 
this research project. 
OVERVIEW 
In Chapter 1, we set out to demonstrate that even subtle aspects of the 
experimental procedure can encourage one to selectively attend to affective 
stimulus information. After all, effects of automatic affective stimulus processing 
have been found in numerous studies without manipulations of FSAA. Never-
theless, according to the framework of FSAA such effects must have come about 
because participants were somehow encouraged to attend to affective stimulus 
information. One procedural aspect that is present in many studies is the high 
proportion of affective stimuli. The mere presentation of many affectively 
polarized stimuli in a study might evoke selective attention towards affective 
stimulus information. We investigated this possibility in one experiment in which 
we presented participants with affective priming trials in which participants were 
asked to name the target stimuli. In one group of participants (the affective 
group), these trials were presented together with a majority of other affective 
priming trials, thus guaranteeing a high proportion of affective stimuli. In another 
group of participants (the non-affective group), the affective priming trials were 
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presented together with a majority of priming trials that contained affectively 
neutral stimuli, thus guaranteeing a low proportion of affective stimuli. Affective 
priming of naming responses was observed in the affective group only. A high 
proportion of affectively polarized stimuli thus seems sufficient in encouraging 
participants to attend to affective stimulus information. This mechanism might 
explain why effects of affective stimulus processing were easily found in other 
studies without explicit manipulations of FSAA. 
In Chapter 2, we tested the prediction that, if FSAA impacts automatic af-
fective stimulus processing, it should also affect consequences of automatic af-
fective stimulus processing. One consequence of automatic affective stimulus 
processing is the power of affective stimuli to grab attention. Once an affective 
stimulus is processed, it can attract attention, an effect commonly referred to as 
“attentional bias” (for a review, see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Yiend, 2010). In two experiments, we 
therefore tested whether a manipulation of FSAA affects attentional bias, as 
measured with the emotional Stroop task in Experiment 1 (Pratto & John, 1991), 
and the dot probe task in Experiment 2 (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). The 
measures of attentional bias were presented on half of the trials in each experi-
ment. On the other half of the trials, participants were asked to perform a cate-
gorization task that was aimed at encouraging them to selectively attend either 
to affective stimulus information or to non-affective stimulus information. More 
specifically, one group of participants (the affective group) was asked to catego-
rize target stimuli as either negative or not negative. The other group of partici-
pants (the non-affective group) was asked to categorize target stimuli as denot-
ing either humans or not humans. As a result, the former group was encouraged 
to selectively attend to affective stimulus information while the latter group was 
encouraged to selectively attend to non-affective semantic stimulus information 
useful for distinguishing humans from non-humans. In line with the FSAA frame-
work of Spruyt et al. (2009), FSAA modulated attentional bias in both experi-
ments. Attentional bias towards negative stimuli was observed in the affective 
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group only. Conversely, if present, an attentional bias towards stimuli denoting 
humans was observed in the non-affective groups only. 
In Chapter 3, we used another marker of attentional bias to further cor-
roborate the hypothesis put forward in Chapter 2. An unpredictable stimulus in a 
sequence of predictable stimuli generally attracts attention, which can be meas-
ured using EEG. Typically, unpredictable stimuli evoke a positive deflection with a 
frontocentral maximum roughly 250 ms after stimulus presentation. This P3a-
component (Polich, 2007), has shown to be sensitive especially to emotional 
changes in stimuli (Campanella et al., 2002). In an EEG study, we presented par-
ticipants with a series of neutral, middle-aged faces interspersed with infrequent 
faces that deviated from the other faces on the basis of their emotional expres-
sion (happy or sad) or their age (young or old). Participants were, again, divided 
in two groups. The affective group was asked to make a response to either the 
happy or the sad faces, depending on the experimental block. The non-affective 
group was asked to make a response to either the young or the old faces, 
depending on the experimental block. As a result, the affective group was 
encouraged to selectively attend to affective stimulus information and the non-
affective group was encouraged to selectively attend to non-affective age-
related stimulus information. Again, FSAA was shown to modulate the size of the 
P3a evoked by rare stimuli. Faces that deviated from the neutral, middle-aged 
faces in terms of their valence evoked a significant P3a in the affective group 
only. Faces that were infrequent with respect to their age evoked a tendency 
towards a P3a in the non-affective group only. In sum, Chapter 2 as well as 
Chapter 3 provided convincing evidence for the hypothesis that FSAA impacts 
not only automatic affective stimulus processing per se, but also the 
consequences of this automatic affective stimulus processing, such as attentional 
bias. 
In Chapter 4, we addressed a methodological concern related to the 
previous studies. In none of the earlier studies an independent measure of FSAA 
was administered and no manipulation check was thus incorporated in the ex-
perimental designs.  The effectiveness of the manipulation of FSAA was simply 
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deduced from its effects on measures of automatic affective stimulus processing. 
We therefore set out to validate a method that allows one to measure the extent 
to which different stimulus features are selectively attended to. Such a method 
could be used in future studies as a manipulation check and could be used to 
assess whether automatic affective stimulus processing is linearly dependent on 
FSAA.  In one experiment we used the INDSCAL algorithm (Carroll & Chang, 1970) 
to achieve a measurement of FSAA.This algorithm converts subjects’ similarity 
judgments between different objects into a multidimensional, spatial represen-
tation of these objects. The dimensions of this representation correspond to the 
different features defining the objects. Importantly, the algorithm yields a set of 
weights that reflect the idiosyncratic weighting of the representation according 
to FSAA. We presented participants with similarity judgment trials to allow for a 
reconstruction of this multidimensional representation. These trials were inter-
mixed with categorization trials to encourage participants to selectively attend to 
either affective stimulus information (the affective group) or non-affective stim-
ulus information (the non-affective group). In line with our predictions, bigger 
attentional weights were assigned to stimulus dimensions that were selectively 
attended to than stimulus dimensions that were not selectively attended to. In a 
future study, we will correlate these attentional weights with affective priming 
indices to investigate whether the extent of automatic affective stimulus pro-
cessing is linearly dependent on the extent of FSAA. 
In sum, the studies described in the current project extend the framework 
of FSAA. First, FSAA can be induced by the mere presentation of affective stimuli. 
Second, the effects of FSAA on affective stimulus processing also extend to con-
sequences of affective stimulus processing. In particular, attentional bias to af-
fective stimuli was shown to depend FSAA. Third, effects of FSAA can be meas-
ured using multidimensional scaling algorithms. These measurement procedures 
can be used in future research as a manipulation check. 
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DISCUSSION 
Automaticity 
First of all, it is important to stress that the current findings do not warrant 
the conclusion that affective stimulus processing occurs in a non-automatic 
fashion. Automaticity is a complex construct that cannot be considered an all-or-
none phenomenon (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). It is best conceived of as an 
umbrella term grouping together several defining, but independent features. 
This conceptualization stems from the finding that there is no one-to-one 
relation between any pair of automaticity features. The presence of one automa-
ticity feature does not imply the presence of other features, nor does the ab-
sence of one feature imply the absence of others. Such weak relations between 
features hamper the internal consistency of the automaticity concept and war-
rant a more decompositional approach to automaticity. According to this ap-
proach, it is best to investigate each feature separately. Taking these considera-
tions into account, it must be clear that the mere observation that FSAA impacts 
automatic affective stimulus processing, does not warrant the conclusion that 
affective stimulus processing proceeds in a non-automatic fashion. After all, in 
spite of this precondition, affective stimulus processing can still occur in a fast 
and efficient fashion, independently of conscious awareness (Spruyt et al., 2012). 
The present findings merely contest the alleged unconditionality of affective 
stimulus processing and suggest FSAA is a necessary precondition for its occur-
rence. 
Implications 
The multidimensional approach 
Perhaps the most important implication of the framework of FSAA is that 
feature-specific attention impacts non-affective and affective stimulus dimen-
sions in a similar way. As a result, the framework also has implications for re-
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search on the processing of non-affective stimulus dimensions and the relations 
between these stimulus dimensions. 
I propose that this general framework can be conceptualized within a 
multidimensional approach which entails that different stimuli can be repre-
sented in a multidimensional psychological space. The stimulus dimensions can 
refer to all possible features that define the stimuli. The processing of various 
such dimensions has been the topic of many ongoing research efforts. Especially 
in social psychology, many stimulus dimensions that are implicated in attitudes 
and stereotypes have been shown to be processed in an automatic and uncondi-
tional fashion. Aside from the affective stimulus dimension, which has been cen-
tral to the current project, such stimulus dimensions include race (e.g. Plous, 
2002; Schneider, 2004), gender (e.g. Swann, Langlois, & Gilbert, 1999), and age 
(e.g. Nelson, 2005). 
These stimulus dimensions do not need to be fully orthogonal, but can re-
late to one another. Stimulus dimensions can thus be oblique, or correlated, 
which can be used to represent several popular psychological constructs such as 
attitudes and stereotypes (e.g. Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & 
Mellott, 2002).  
An attitude, for instance, is essentially an association between a stimulus, 
or class of stimuli, and an affective attribute (Greenwald et al., 2002). Within the 
multidimensional approach, attitude-relevant stimuli thus load highly on the af-
fective stimulus dimension. Furthermore, as classes of attitude-relevant stimuli 
can be conceptualized as attitude-relevant stimulus dimensions (e.g. race), their 
corresponding attitudes can be represented by a correlation between these atti-
tude-relevant stimulus dimensions and the affective stimulus dimension. In 
Figure 1, for instance, racial attitudes can be represented in a multidimensional 
space with two stimulus dimensions: a race dimension and an affective stimulus 
dimension. When no racial bias is present, the two stimulus dimensions are 
completely orthogonal, showing no correlation between race and valence (Figure 
1a). When racial bias is present, however, the two stimulus dimensions are as-
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sumed to be oblique, reflecting a correlation between race and valence (Figure 
1b). As a result, exemplars with high values on the race dimension will have more 
extreme values on the affective stimulus dimension as well. Specific forms of 
anxiety and phobias may also be conceptualized as reflecting extreme attitudes 
in this sense. Phobia-relevant stimulus dimensions are assumed to correlate 
heavily with the affective stimulus dimension.  
 
Figure 2. Multidimensional conceptualization of attitudes towards different 
races. a) No racial bias is present: the race dimension and the affective stimulus 
dimension are orthogonal. b) A racial bias is represented by a sharper angle 
between the race dimension and the affective stimulus dimension. 
A stereotype, which can be defined as an association between a class of 
stimuli and non-affective attributes (Greenwald et al., 2002),  can readily be 
represented by oblique stimulus dimensions as well. In this case, stereotypes 
reflect a correlation between non-affective stimulus dimensions. Consider, for 
instance, the stereotype that “white men can’t jump”, which is very popular in 
basketball culture (e.g. Shelton, 1992). This stereotype can be conceptualized as 
a correlation between a race dimension and a stimulus dimension depicting a 
person’s ability to jump (Figure 2). 
a) b) 
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Figure 2. Multidimensional conceptualization of the stereotype that “white men 
can’t jump”. The horizontal stimulus dimension reflects race while the other 
stimulus dimension reflects one’s ability to jump. The stereotype is present only in 
panel b, as shown by the oblique stimulus dimensions. 
Aside from attitudes, phobias and stereotypes, many “automatic associa-
tions” have surfaced in psychological research that can be represented by 
oblique stimulus dimensions in the multidimensional approach as well. Such au-
tomatic associations have been suggested to be involved in many social issues 
such as sexual harassment and alcohol abuse. Bargh, Raymond, Pryer, and Strack 
(1995), for instance, used a priming paradigm to show that the concepts ‘power’ 
and ‘sex’ are associated with each other in men who are more likely to sexually 
harass (also see, Mussweiler & Forster, 2000). Subra, Muller, Begue, Buschman, 
and Delmas (2010) reported similar associations between alcohol and aggres-
sion, also using a priming paradigm. These automatic links can easily be concep-
tualized by allowing correlations between the involved stimulus dimensions such 
as a power dimensions and a sex dimension, or a dimension related to alcohol 
content and a dimension related to amount of aggression. 
FSAA is thought to operate on the multidimensional space by stretching 
those stimulus dimensions that are selectively attended to and shrinking the 
stimulus dimensions that are not selectively attended to (e.g. Medin & Schaffer, 
a) b) 
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1978; Nosofsky, 1986).  As a result, stimulus differences along stretched dimen-
sions become more apparent and easier to process while stimulus differences 
along shrunken dimensions become less apparent and harder to process. Im-
portantly, this mechanism influences affective stimulus dimensions as well as 
non-affective stimulus dimensions. The framework thus implies that not only 
automatic affective stimulus processing is dependent on FSAA, but also the pro-
cessing of other stimulus features such as the previously mentioned age, race, 
and gender. The activation of attitudes, stereotypes, and automatic associations 
(e.g. alcohol and aggression; Subra et al., 2010) thus depends on FSAA as well. 
Consequently, research on the effects of feature-specific attention allocation in 
these aforementioned research topics might prove fruitful and add greatly to the 
understanding of such phenomena and their effects on behavior. 
Flexibility of feature-specific attention allocation 
FSAA is driven by the goals held by the person. The flexibility with which 
feature-specific attention is switched across stimulus dimensions and with which 
it is deployed to stimulus dimensions is further dependent on the perseverance 
of such goals. There are several possible instances that bias this flexibility and 
could lead to an almost chronic deployment of feature-specific attention to cer-
tain stimulus dimensions. 
First, it is possible that, given the adaptive importance, selective attention 
is assigned to the affective stimulus dimension by default. Such default allocation 
might partly explain why effects of automatic affective stimulus processing are 
easily found without explicit manipulations of FSAA. Apart from the subtle cues 
in the experimental procedure laid out in Chapter 1, participants might attend to 
the affective stimulus dimension because it is adaptive to do so. Nevertheless, 
this default mode of FSAA might be overwritten flexibly in favor of the current 
task demands and goals. 
Second, some goals might be of such importance to a particular person 
that attention is assigned chronically to the stimulus dimensions that are some-
how related to the particular goal. For instance, populations poor in emotion 
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regulation and high in anxiety seem to be biased to selectively attend to the af-
fective stimulus dimension. For instance, poor emotion regulators have been 
shown to be less flexible in switching between a task that requires one to 
selectively attend to the affective stimulus dimension and a task that requires 
one to selectively attend to a non-affective stimulus dimension (Genet & Siemer, 
2011; Johnson, 2009).  
This bias could persevere even more in populations suffering from anxiety 
disorders, as evidenced by the bulk of findings showing attentional bias in these 
populations (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Aside from attentional bias towards gener-
ally negative stimuli, many instances have been found of attentional bias to spe-
cific stimuli relating to the concerns of a population with a given psycho-
pathology (Williams, Matthews, & MacLeod, 1996). Mogg, Mathews, and 
Weinman (1989) for instance, observed that socially anxious individuals showed 
greater emotional Stroop effects for words that were related to social threat 
than to physical threat. Anxious individuals with physical worries on the other 
hand, showed greater emotional Stroop effects for words related to physical 
threat than to social threat. Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, and Trezise (1986) ob-
served tremendous emotional Stroop effects for spider related words in Spider 
phobics, and Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, and McCarthy (1991) detected similar 
effects for words related to rape in a sample of rape victims. Furthermore, multi-
dimensional scaling studies have shown that spider-fearful persons add greater 
weight to the affective stimulus dimension than non-fearful persons (Cavanagh & 
Davey, 2001). Persons showing bulimic symptoms on the other hand, tend to 
weight the stimulus dimension related to body size more than persons that don’t 
show such symptoms (Viken, Treat, Nosofsky, McFall, & Palmeri, 2002). 
Much like phobic and high-anxious populations chronically attend to stim-
ulus dimensions relevant to the specific pathology, some attitudes might be of 
such personal relevance that the attitude-relevant stimulus dimensions are 
rigidly attended to as well. In accordance with the framework of FSAA, effects of 
automatic attitude activation should therefore be found more readily for those 
objects that are of importance to the specific subject. This idea fits nicely with 
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earlier theorizing by Fazio (1990) who coined the term “attitude accessibility” to 
refer to differences in which objects activate their corresponding attitudes. High 
accessible attitudes are easily activated upon perception of the instigating object 
while low accessible attitudes are hardly activated at all upon perception of the 
attitude-relevant object. Moreover, attitudes that are highly accessible are 
usually personally relevant as well (Bizer & Krosnick, 2001; Krosnick, 1989). The 
framework of FSAA adds to this idea by proposing that these highly accessible 
attitudes are activated automatically and unconditionally because the attitude-
relevant stimulus dimensions are chronically attended to.  
Nevertheless, Fazio’s (1990) model received some criticisms from authors 
showing that even low accessible attitudes seem to be activated unconditionally 
(Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Bargh et al., 1996). This inconsistency 
might be accounted for by the framework of FSAA, which also proposes that as-
pects of the experimental procedure can influence FSAA (e.g. Chapter 1; Spruyt, 
Everaert, De Houwer, Moors, & Hermans, 2008). For instance, subtle cues in the 
experimental procedure could have encouraged participants to selectively attend 
to the affective stimulus dimension. This encouragement might have led to the 
automatic activation of any attitude, regardless of its accessibility under natural 
circumstances (e.g. Chapter 1). 
Measures of attitudes 
Since attitudes are, in essence, evaluations of stimuli (e.g. Allport, 1935), 
there has been a long line of research using measures of automatic affective 
stimulus processing to measure automatic attitude activation (De Houwer, Teige-
Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009; Fazio & Olson, 2003). Such “implicit” 
measures are thought to hold a crucial benefit over explicit attitude measures 
because they are assumed to be affected less by response bias, inaccessibility in 
consciousness, and social desirability (but see, Czellar, 2006; De Houwer, 
Beckers, & Moors, 2007). However, the framework of FSAA has far-reaching im-
plications for research on automatic attitude activation. The framework predicts 
that automatic affective stimulus processing occurs only to the extent that affec-
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tive stimulus information is selectively attended to. Consequently, automatic 
attitude activation does not occur unconditionally but surfaces only when atten-
tion is directed to affective stimulus features. As mentioned in the previous par-
agraph, while FSAA might be assigned chronically to some important attitude-
relevant stimulus dimensions, it can be changed flexibly in function of the cur-
rent goals.  
This malleability of FSAA can severely hamper the reliability and validity of 
implicit measures of attitudes. First, fluctuations in patterns of FSAA affect the 
expression of attitudes over time and situations, weakening the reliability of the 
measures. Second, their construct validity is also affected because attitudes are 
only measured under some circumstances. Moreover, when attitudes do surface 
in implicit measures, they reflect the joint effect of the attitude and FSAA. Third, 
the predictive validity of implicit measures suffers greatly as well. If the activa-
tion of an attitude is dependent on FSAA, so is the behavior instigated by those 
attitudes. Consequently, an implicit measure will not predict behavior when the 
attitude and the to-be-predicted behavior are not assessed under similar condi-
tions of feature-specific attention. For instance, if an attitude is assessed when 
selective attention is directed towards affective stimulus information, the meas-
ure will not predict behavior occurring in situations in which affective stimulus 
information is not selectively attended to. Moreover, when selective attention is 
not directed to affective stimulus information during measurement, the measure 
will not predict any behavior as attitudes where not activated during measure-
ment and were therefore not assessed. 
Furthermore, the process of measurement can influence FSAA as well. In 
many implicit measures, tasks are used that encourage participants to selectively 
attend to affective stimulus information. For instance, the affective priming par-
adigm (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), the implicit association test 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), and the affect misattribution proce-
dure (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) all employ the affective categori-
zation task. Such a task requires participants to selectively attend to the affective 
stimulus dimension to ensure good performance (e.g. Spruyt et al., 2009). Par-
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ticipants strategically assign attention so as to maximize the differences between 
positive and negative stimuli while minimizing the differences within these re-
spective stimulus categories (see Smith & Zaraté, 1992, for an example on social 
categorization). Under these circumstances, such an extreme enhancement by 
attention can boost the affectivity of even the most insignificantly affective 
stimulus. Consequently, the procedure may drastically reduce inter-individual 
differences in spontaneous automatic attitude activation, rendering the meas-
urement ineffective. Moreover, aspects of the experimental procedure other 
than the specific task used can implicitly encourage one to selectively attend to 
affective stimulus information as well. In Chapter 1, for instance, we demon-
strated that even the mere presentation of affectively polarized stimuli can en-
gender such effects. 
Such obstacles might be overcome by using implicit measures that do not 
affect FSAA. These measures would be sensitive only to those attitudes that are 
personally relevant and consequently subject to chronic attention. Measures 
that do not include an affective categorization task might therefore be more 
suitable to measure personally relevant attitudes. Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, 
Vandekerckhoven, and Eelen (2007; also see Vandromme, Hermans, & Spruyt, 
2011) showed that one such a task, the picture-picture naming task, has good 
predictive power. In this variant of the affective priming paradigm, prime and 
target stimuli are pictures and participants are asked to name the target pictures. 
Spruyt, Hermans et al. (2007) used this task to predict participants’ choice be-
tween either fruit or a candy bar. The obtained affective priming indices were 
found to predict this consumer choice behavior better than other measures that 
employed an affective categorization task. While the presentation of affective 
stimuli in this task might encourage one to selectively attend to the affective 
stimulus dimension, it does so to a lesser extent than the explicit use of an affec-
tive categorization task. Moreover, measuring the attitude instigated by an ob-
ject is virtually impossible without presenting the object in question. 
Multidimensional scaling algorithms might prove useful in the context of 
attitude measurement as well. The IDIOSCAL algorithm, for instance, is an exten-
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sion of the INDSCAL algorithm that allows for the extraction of stimulus dimen-
sions, the idiosyncratic weighting of the dimensions, and importantly, the angles 
between the stimulus dimensions (Carroll & Chang, 1972). Furthermore, the in-
put of the algorithm can consist of simple similarity judgments and no affective 
categorization is necessary. As mentioned above, an attitude can be reflected in 
the multidimensional approach by a correlation between an attitude-relevant 
stimulus dimension (e.g. race, gender, …) and the affective stimulus dimension. 
IDIOSCAL can recover such a correlation from similarity judgment data and can 
thus provide an alternative attitude measure. In addition, stereotypes can be 
measured in a similar fashion by recovering the correlation between the stimulus 
dimension related to the social group (e.g. race, gender,…) and a stimulus dimen-
sion related to the stereotypical attribute (e.g. ability to jump, ability to drive). 
Patterns of FSAA can be taken into account with the dimension weights yielded 
by the algorithm. As the stimulus dimensions related to stronger attitudes are 
more chronically attended to, one could index attitude strength by the con-
sistency with which attitude-relevant stimulus dimensions are attended to under 
different conditions. 
Psychopathology 
As mentioned above, FSAA might be implicated in psychopathology as well. 
Selective attention might be assigned chronically to those stimulus dimensions 
that are of great relevance to a specific psychopathological population. This 
chronic attention assignment can lead to an attentional bias, as evidenced in 
Chapter 2. Such attentional biases have been presupposed to play a crucial role 
in anxiety (e.g. Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Many attempts have therefore been 
made to alter anxiety by altering attentional bias through so-called “attentional 
retraining” (Macleod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). In at-
tentional retraining studies, participants are trained to attend either towards or 
away from threatening stimuli in a modified version of the dot probe task 
(MacLeod et al., 1986). In a common dot probe task, participants are asked to 
respond to the location of visually presented dot probes on the screen. Each 
probe is preceded by the short, simultaneous presentation of a neutral and a 
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threatening stimulus in two different locations of the screen. An attentional bias 
is thought to have occurred when responses are faster when the probe is pre-
sented on the location in which a threatening stimulus was presented previously 
compared to when the probe is presented on the location in which a neutral 
stimulus was presented previously. Participants can be trained to attend away 
from negative stimuli by presenting the probe on the location of the neutral pic-
ture in a majority of the trials.  
Such attentional retraining has been shown to reduce symptoms of social 
anxiety (e.g. Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008; Schmidt, Richey, 
Buckner, & Timpano, 2009) and generalized anxiety disorder (e.g. Amir, Beard, 
Burns, & Bomyea, 2009). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of attentional retraining 
in counteracting anxiety is still a highly debated topic. First, it does not seem ef-
fective in reducing all forms of anxiety, such as spider phobia (Reese, McNally, 
Najmi, & Amir, 2010; Van Bockstaele, Verschuere, Koster, Tibboel, De Houwer, & 
Crombez, 2011). Second, the attentional retraining effect does not seem to gen-
eralize across different tasks. Van Bockstaele, Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, and 
De Houwer (2012), for instance, found that the reduction of attentional bias 
through the modified dot probe task did not become apparent when measured 
with an emotional interference task. Third, attentional retraining does not seem 
to affect the early, automatic components of attentional bias, but rather its late, 
more controlled components (Koster, Baert, Bockstaele, and De Raedt, 2010). 
Attention seems to be directed primarily to threatening stimuli, whereas it can 
be directed away from threat only later. Attentional retraining therefore does 
not seem to alter the most important processes underlying attentional bias and 
anxiety as such. 
Perhaps a reason for such ambiguous results involves FSAA. While partici-
pants are trained to direct spatial attention away from a threatening stimulus, 
they might still have attended to the affective stimulus dimension. After all, at-
tending away from a specific stimulus requires one to identify the stimulus first. 
In the case of attentional retraining, attention towards the affective stimulus 
dimension can aid participants in identifying the threatening stimulus to direct 
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spatial attention away from it. A more suitable way to alter processes underlying 
anxiety might be to train one to attend away from the affective stimulus dimen-
sion instead of attending away from the spatial location of the affective stimulus. 
Such feature-specific attentional retraining could change the early, automatic 
processes underlying attentional bias and might prove more beneficial in reduc-
ing symptoms of anxiety as such. Preliminary evidence for feature-specific atten-
tional retraining can be found in Chapter 2. Manipulations of FSAA seem to be 
able to change attentional bias. It remains to be seen, however, whether such 
manipulations affect early, automatic components of attentional bias, whether 
feature-specific attentional retraining can easily be accomplished, and whether it 
also reduces symptoms of anxiety. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past four years, we systematically tested several predictions 
stemming from the framework of FSAA (Spruyt et al., 2009). According to this 
framework automatic affective stimulus processing is dependent on the extent 
to which affective stimulus information is selectively attended to. We first 
demonstrated that FSAA can be instigated by subtle characteristics of the ex-
perimental procedure. We then further corroborated the framework  by showing 
that FSAA affects various consequences of affective stimulus processing. In a final 
study, multidimensional scaling was put forward as a possible method that al-
lows for the measurement FSAA. This method could be used in future research to 
assess whether automatic affective stimulus processing is linearly dependent on 
FSAA. Our research and future research on FSAA can contribute to our under-
standing in a variety of important research domains such as attitude 
measurement and attentional retraining in attentional bias. 
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 NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
Reeds in het begin van de vorige eeuw stelden verschillende invloedrijke 
auteurs dat mensen over een mechanisme beschikken dat elke stimulus die 
waargenomen wordt onconditioneel en automatisch evalueert (e.g., Arnold, 
1960; Bartlett, 1932; Lazarus, 1966; Wundt, 1907). Zo een veronderstelling lijkt 
niet meer dan logisch, aangezien een automatische evaluatie van een stimulus 
het verschil kan betekenen tussen leven en dood. Een diepgaande experimentele 
analyse van “affectieve prikkelverwerking” liet echter op zich wachten tot de 
jaren tachtig, dankzij het invloedrijke werk van Zajonc (1980, 1984). 
Het bestuderen van affectieve prikkelverwerking vereist methoden die ons 
toelaten om dit mentale proces adequaat te meten. In de gedragswetenschap-
pen is het affectieve priming paradigma met alle waarschijnlijkheid het meest 
populaire paradigma dat wordt gebruikt om affectieve prikkelverwerking te be-
studeren (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). Tijdens de affectieve 
priming taak worden deelnemers gevraagd om verschillende affectief gepolari-
seerde “doelprikkels” te categoriseren als zijnde “positief” of “negatief” (i.e. de 
affectieve categorisatietaak). Elke doelprikkel wordt voorafgegaan door de korte 
presentatie van een affectief gepolariseerde “primeprikkel” die niet relevant is 
voor het uitvoeren van de taak. Hoewel de prime taakirrelevant is, beïnvloedt 
diens affectieve waarde systematisch de taakprestaties. Deelnemers voeren de 
taak doorgaans beter uit wanneer de prime en de target tot dezelfde affectieve 
categorie behoren (bv. de woorden “vriend” en “puppy”) dan wanneer ze tot 
verschillende affectieve categorieën behoren (bv. de woorden “vriend” en “ver-
krachter”). Dit “affectieve priming effect” kan enkel voorkomen wanneer de af-
fectieve waarde van de primeprikkel verwerkt werd en dient bijgevolg als maat 
voor de affectieve verwerking van de primeprikkel. 
Recent experimenteel onderzoek waarin o.a. het affectieve priming para-
digma werd gebruikt heeft inderdaad bevestigd dat affectieve prikkelverwerking 
de kenmerken van een automatisch proces bevat. Een proces wordt doorgaans 
als automatisch beschouwd wanneer het snel is en onafhankelijk verloopt van 
148  NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
cognitieve capaciteit, bewustzijn en de huidige doelen (voor een review over 
automaticiteit, zie Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Deze kenmerken kwamen syste-
matisch naar boven in onderzoek met het affectieve priming paradigma. Hun 
bestaan werd afgeleid uit het feit dat het affectieve priming effect toch geobser-
veerd werd onder tal van condities die de verwerking van de prime significant 
moeilijker maakten. Zo concludeerden Hermans, De Houwer en Eelen (2001) dat 
affectieve stimulusverwerking snel verloopt omdat affectieve priming effecten 
gevonden werden zelfs wanneer de doelprikkel de primeprikkel zeer snel op-
volgde (reeds na 150 ms). Hermans, Crombez en Eelen (2001) toonden dan weer 
aan dat affectieve prikkelverwerking niet afhankelijk is van cognitieve capaciteit 
en dus heel efficiënt verloopt. Affectieve priming effecten werden immers ge-
vonden wanneer tezelfdertijd een moeilijke tweede taak werd uitgevoerd die de 
cognitieve hulpbronnen zwaar taxeerde. In andere studies werd aangetoond dat 
affectieve prikkelverwerking gebeurt zelfs voor prikkels die niet bewust waarge-
nomen worden (Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 
1996). Zo werden affectieve priming effecten gevonden wanneer de primeprikkel 
niet bewust werd waargenomen. Affectieve prikkelverwerking bleek ook onaf-
hankelijk te zijn van een expliciet evaluatief verwerkingsdoel (Bargh, Chaiken, 
Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1994). Wanneer een 
taak gebruikt werd die geen expliciete evaluatie vereiste, namelijk het benoemen 
van de doelprikkel, werden affectieve priming effecten nog steeds geobserveerd. 
Ook in de neurowetenschappen werden gelijkaardige indicaties van affec-
tieve prikkelverwerking als automatische proces vastgesteld. Hier werd eveneens 
vastgesteld dat affectieve prikkels neurale activiteit heel vroeg beïnvloedden (bv. 
Carretié, Hinojosa, Martin-Loeches, Mercado, & Tapia, 2004), zelfs wanneer een 
moeilijke tweede taak werd aangeboden (bv. Hajcak, Dunning, & Foti, 2007), 
wanneer de stimulus niet bewust verwerkt werd (bv. Vuilleumier, Armony, 
Driver, & Dolan, 2001), en wanneer taken werden gebruikt die geen evaluatief 
verwerkingsdoel vereisten (bv. Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003; 
Vuilleumier et al., 2001). 
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Hoewel de bovenvermelde studies overtuigende evidentie vormden voor 
affectieve prikkelverwerking als onconditioneel en automatisch proces, versche-
nen er verschillende andere studies waarin dit niet zo bleek te zijn. Zo heerst er 
bijvoorbeeld nog steeds enige discussie over de rol van een expliciet evaluatief 
verwerkingsdoel in affectieve prikkelverwerking. Hoewel enkele onderzoekers 
initieel affectieve priming effecten observeerden wanneer men de doelprikkels 
louter diende te benoemen (Bargh et al., 1996; Hermans et al., 1994), kon niet 
iedereen deze effecten repliceren (Klauer & Musch, 2001; Spruyt, Hermans, 
Pandelaere, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004). Ook in de neurowetenschappen heerst 
er geen consensus over de onconditionaliteit en automaticiteit van affectieve 
prikkelverwerking (bv. Pessoa, 2005). 
Spruyt, De Houwer en Hermans (2009; zie ook Spruyt, De Houwer, 
Hermans, & Eelen, 2007; Spruyt, De Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 2012) stelden 
recent een verklaring voor deze inconsistente bevindingen voor. Zij suggereerden 
dat automatische affectieve prikkelverwerking sterk afhankelijk is van 
kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing. Affectieve prikkelverwerking werd ver-
ondersteld enkel te gebeuren wanneer selectief aandacht wordt besteed aan 
affectieve prikkelinformatie. Wanneer selectieve aandacht wordt besteed aan 
niet-affectieve prikkelinformatie, wordt echter geen automatische affectieve 
prikkelverwerking verwacht maar een diepere verwerking van deze niet-affec-
tieve prikkelinformatie. Verschillende studies boden evidentie voor deze verkla-
ring. In één dergelijke studie, werd het affectieve priming paradigma gebruikt om 
automatische affectieve prikkelverwerking te meten. Tijdens 25 % van de expe-
rimentele beurten voerden de deelnemers de bovenvermelde benoemingstaak 
uit op de doelprikkels. Tijdens de overige 75 % van de beurten voerde één groep 
deelnemers (de affectieve groep) de affectieve categorisatietaak uit terwijl een 
andere groep  deelnemers (de niet-affectieve groep) een niet-affectieve, seman-
tische categorisatietaak uitvoerde. Deze groep werd gevraagd te beslissen of de 
doelprikkels duidden op een dier of een object. De categorisatietaak werd steeds 
gebruikt als middel om de deelnemers aan te moedigen tot het besteden van 
aandacht aan affectieve prikkelinformatie in de affectieve groep of niet-
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affectieve, semantische prikkelinformatie in de niet-affectieve groep. In overeen-
stemming met de verklaring van kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing werd 
affectieve priming van benoemingsresponsen enkel gevonden in de affectieve 
groep. In de niet-affectieve groep werd echter semantische priming van benoe-
mingsresponsen geobserveerd. De deelnemers van deze groep presteerden 
beter wanneer de doelprikkel en de primeprikkel tot dezelfde semantische cate-
gorie (dier of object) behoorden dan wanneer deze niet tot dezelfde semantische 
categorie behoorden. Deze modulatie door kenmerkspecifieke aandachts-
toewijzing werd teruggevonden in tal van studies (Spruyt et al., 2007, 2009) en 
was zelfs van kracht wanneer de primeprikkels niet bewust werden waargeno-
men (Spruyt et al., 2012). 
OVERZICHT VAN HET PROJECT 
De bovenvermelde studies vormden de eerste evidentie voor kenmerk-
specifieke aandachtstoewijzing als cruciale factor in automatische affectieve 
prikkelverwerking. Uit deze verklaring volgen echter nog enkele predicties die 
systematisch getoetst werden in het project. 
Subtiele aspecten van de experimentele procedure beïnvloeden 
kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing 
Een eerste predictie betreft de mogelijke factoren die kenmerkspecifieke 
aandachtstoewijzing voor affectieve prikkelinformatie kunnen beïnvloeden. Vol-
gens Spruyt et al.’s (2007, 2009, 2012) verklaring komt automatische affectieve 
prikkelverwerking enkel voor wanneer men selectieve aandacht besteedt aan 
affectieve prikkelinformatie. Bijgevolg impliceren effecten van automatische af-
fectieve prikkelverwerking dat affectieve prikkelinformatie noodzakelijkerwijs 
selectieve aandacht toegewezen kreeg. In verschillende studies werd affectieve 
priming van benoemingsresponsen echter gevonden zonder expliciete manipula-
ties van selectieve aandacht (e.g. Bargh et al., 1996; Hermans et al., 1994). Mo-
gelijks beïnvloeden subtiele aspecten van de experimentele procedure van deze 
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studies de deelnemers impliciet tot het aandacht schenken aan affectieve 
prikkelinformatie. Dergelijke aspecten omvatten o.a. het opvallend gebruik van 
affectief gepolariseerde prikkels, de verwoording van de instructies, de informa-
tie in het informed consent formulier, kennis van het onderzoek dat in het speci-
fieke lab gebeurt, enzovoort.  
In Hoofdstuk 1, werd nagegaan of één van deze aspecten, namelijk het op-
vallend gebruik van affectief gepolariseerde prikkels, daadwerkelijk kenmerk-
specifieke aandachtstoewijzing beïnvloedt. In een studie pasten we hiervoor het 
affectieve priming paradigma toe waarin de benoemingstaak werd gebruikt. Een 
vierde van alle beurten bestond uit dergelijke affectieve priming beurten. Deze 
“experimentele beurten” werden samen aangeboden met andere “context-
beurten” die affectief gepolariseerde prikkels bevatten in één groep deelnemers 
(de affectieve groep) en affectief neutrale prikkels bevatten in een andere groep 
deelnemers (de niet-affectieve groep). In de affectieve groep werden de deel-
nemers bijgevolg blootgesteld aan een hoge proportie affectief gepolariseerde 
prikkels. In de niet-affectieve groep daarentegen werden de deelnemers bloot-
gesteld aan een lage proportie affectief gepolariseerde prikkels. Volgens de ver-
klaring van kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing zou de hoge proportie affec-
tief gepolariseerde prikkels in de affectieve groep de deelnemers ertoe aanmoe-
digen om aandacht te schenken aan affectieve prikkelinformatie. In de niet-af-
fectieve groep zou de lage proportie affectief gepolariseerde prikkels affectieve 
prikkelinformatie net minder opvallend maken, waardoor er minder aandacht 
aan geschonken zou worden. In overeenstemming met deze verklaring werd af-
fectieve priming van benoemingsresponsen enkel geobserveerd in de affectieve 
groep. Bijgevolg lijken subtiele aspecten van de experimentele procedure vol-
doende te zijn om selectieve aandacht voor affectieve prikkelinformatie te indu-
ceren zonder expliciete manipulaties van aandacht. 
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Kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing beïnvloedt de gevolgen van 
automatische affectieve prikkelverwerking 
Een tweede predictie betreft de effecten van kenmerkspecifieke 
aandachtstoewijzing op gevolgen van automatische affectieve prikkelverwerking. 
In eerdere studies werd de invloed van kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing 
steeds aangetoond met het affectieve priming paradigma. In dit paradigma 
wordt automatische affectieve prikkelverwerking steeds gemeten via één of 
meerdere van diens gevolgen op andere processen of gedrag. Het affectieve 
priming paradigma waarin de benoemingstaak wordt gebruikt laat ons bijvoor-
beeld toe automatische affectieve prikkelverwerking te meten omdat affectieve 
prikkels het coderen van affectief congruente prikkels faciliteren (bv. Spruyt et 
al., 2007). Aangezien verondersteld wordt dat kenmerkspecifieke aandachts-
toewijzing automatische affectieve prikkelverwerking beïnvloedt, kan echter 
gesteld worden dat elk mogelijk gevolg van automatische affectieve prikkel-
verwerking eveneens beïnvloed wordt door kenmerkspecifieke aandachts-
toewijzing. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 werd daarom de impact van kenmerkspecifieke aandachts-
toewijzing op een ander gevolg van automatische affectieve prikkelverwerking 
nagegaan, namelijk het vermogen van een affectieve stimulus tot het trekken 
van aandacht (voor reviews, zie Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Yiend, 2010). Een dergelijke aandachtsbias 
kan gemeten worden met verschillende paradigma’s. In de emotionele Stroop-
taak (Pratto & John, 1991, Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996) bijvoorbeeld, 
worden deelnemers gevraagd de kleur te benoemen van verschillende sequenti-
eel gepresenteerde woorden waarvan de betekenis taakirrelevant is. Prestaties 
zijn doorgaans slechter wanneer de connotatie van de woorden negatief is dan 
wanneer deze neutraal is. Dit emotionele Stroopeffect wordt verondersteld tot 
stand te komen omdat de negatieve, taakirrelevante betekenis van de woorden 
de aandacht wegtrekt van de taakdoelen. De dot probe taak is een andere po-
pulaire taak die eveneens vaak gebruikt wordt voor het meten van affectieve 
aandachtsbias (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). In deze taak worden deelne-
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mers gevraagd te reageren op de locatie van zgn. dot probes, simpele 
perceptuele prikkels (bv. een klein vierkant, een punt, …). De presentatie van 
elke dot probe wordt voorafgegaan door de presentatie van een negatief en een 
neutraal beeld die elk op een andere locatie in het scherm verschijnen. Prestaties 
zijn gewoonlijk beter wanneer de dot probe verschijnt op de locatie waarop eer-
der een negatief beeld gepresenteerd werd dan op de locatie waarop eerder een 
neutraal beeld gepresenteerd werd. Dit effect zou tot stand komen omdat het 
negatieve beeld aandacht trekt naar diens positie en zo het verdere lokaliseren 
van de dot probe beïnvloedt. 
In twee experimenten werd kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing gema-
nipuleerd terwijl aandachtsbias gemeten werd met de emotionele Strooptaak 
(Experiment 1) en de dot probe taak (Experiment 2). Tijdens de helft van de 
beurten werden de deelnemers gevraagd een categorisatietaak uit te voeren. 
Deze taak werd gebruikt om de deelnemers aan te moedigen tot het besteden 
van aandacht aan affectieve prikkelinformatie in één groep deelnemers (de af-
fectieve groep) of niet-affectieve prikkelinformatie in een andere groep deelne-
mers (de niet-affectieve groep). In de affectieve groep werden de deelnemers 
gevraagd prikkels te categoriseren als zijnde “negatief” of “niet negatief”. In de 
niet-affectieve groep werden de deelnemers gevraagd prikkels te categoriseren 
als zijnde “mens” of “niet mens”. Tijdens de andere helft van de beurten voerden 
de deelnemers de emotionele Strooptaak (Experiment 1) of de dot probe taak 
(Experiment 2) uit. In overeenstemming met de bovenvermelde predictie bleken 
de maten voor aandachtsbias eveneens gevoelig aan een manipulatie van 
kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing. Een aandachtsbias voor negatieve prik-
kels werd enkel vastgesteld in de affectieve groepen. Bovendien werden indica-
ties voor een aandachtsbias voor niet-affectieve prikkels vastgesteld in de niet-
affectieve groepen. In deze groep leken prikkels die duidden op mensen de aan-
dacht te trekken. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 werd de impact van kenmerkspecifieke aandachts-
toewijzing op een andere, neurale manifestatie van aandachtsbias nagegaan. 
Wanneer een sequentie prikkels op voorspelbare wijze aangeboden wordt, trekt 
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een onverwachte prikkel aandacht naar zich toe. Deze aandachtsbias kan geme-
ten worden met behulp van EEG metingen en manifesteert zich als een ERP 
component die de P3a genoemd wordt (Polich, 2007). Deze component blijkt 
gevoeliger te zijn voor emotionele veranderingen dan voor niet-emotionele ver-
anderingen in prikkels (Campanella et al., 2002). In een EEG studie werd een se-
quentie gezichten gepresenteerd van middelbare leeftijd met neutrale gelaats-
expressies. Occasioneel werden afwijkende gezichten aangeboden die blij, droe-
vig, jong of oud konden zijn. Eén groep deelnemers (de affectieve groep) werd 
gevraagd te reageren wanneer een blij of droevig gezicht verscheen. Bijgevolg 
werd deze groep aangemoedigd tot het besteden van aandacht aan affectieve 
prikkelinformatie. Een andere groep deelnemers (de niet-affectieve groep) werd 
gevraagd te reageren wanneer een jong of oud gezicht verscheen. Derhalve werd 
deze groep aangemoedigd tot het besteden van aandacht aan niet-affectieve 
prikkelinformatie. Wederom beïnvloedde kenmerkspecifieke aandachts-
toewijzing de aandachtsbias zoals gemeten via de P3a. Een significante P3a voor 
emotioneel onverwachte prikkels werd enkel geobserveerd in de affectieve 
groep. Indicaties voor een P3a voor prikkels met een onverwachte leeftijd daar-
entegen, werden enkel geobserveerd in de niet-affectieve groep. 
Aldus lijken de gevolgen van automatische affectieve prikkelverwerking 
eveneens gevoelig voor kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing. 
Het meten van kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing 
De bovenvermelde studies van Spruyt et al. (2007, 2009, 2012) en de stu-
dies die werden uitgevoerd in dit project kennen een algemene beperking. Tot 
nu toe werd nooit een onafhankelijke maat van kenmerkspecifieke aandachts-
toewijzing afgenomen en werd er dus geen manipulatiecheck opgenomen in het 
experimentele design. De doeltreffendheid van de manipulatie werd slechts af-
geleid uit diens effect op maten van automatische affectieve prikkelverwerking. 
Kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing werd echter nooit direct gemeten en er 
kan dus niet met zekerheid aangenomen worden dat de manipulatie daadwerke-
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lijk kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing beïnvloedde. Tot nu toe zijn er echter 
geen maten bekend die regelmatig worden toegepast in de praktijk. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 werd een mogelijke maat voor kenmerkspecifieke 
aandachtstoewijzing gevalideerd. De maat betreft INDSCAL, een speciale toe-
passing van multidimensionale schalering (Carroll & Chang, 1970). In deze 
methode worden gelijkenisoordelen van paren prikkels gebruikt om er een multi-
dimensionale voorstelling van te bekomen. De prikkels worden voorgesteld in 
een ruimte met verschillende dimensies die corresponderen met de kenmerken 
die de prikkels definiëren (bv. emotie, leeftijd, geslacht, …). Kenmerkspecifieke 
aandachtstoewijzing wordt in deze voorstelling gerepresenteerd door het wegen 
van de verschillende prikkeldimensies. Als een prikkeldimensie aandacht toege-
wezen krijgt, wordt deze uitgerekt in de ruimte waardoor prikkelverschillen met 
betrekking tot deze dimensie meer opvallen en gemakkelijker verwerkt worden. 
Een prikkeldimensie die geen aandacht toegewezen krijgt daarentegen, krimpt in 
de ruimte waardoor prikkelverschillen met betrekking tot deze dimensie net 
minder opvallen en moeilijker verwerkt worden. In een experiment werd 
kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing gemanipuleerd terwijl het gemeten 
werd met het INDSCAL algoritme. Wederom werd de deelnemers gevraagd een 
categorisatietaak uit te voeren op de helft van de beurten. Een groep deelne-
mers (de affectieve groep) beoordeelde of aangeboden gezichten een blije of 
droevige gelaatsexpressie hadden terwijl een andere groep deelnemers (de niet-
affectieve groep) beoordeelde of aangeboden gezichten er jong of oud uitzagen. 
Bijgevolg werd de affectieve groep aangemoedigd tot het besteden van aandacht 
aan de affectieve prikkeldimensie en werd de niet-affectieve groep aangemoe-
digd tot het besteden van aandacht aan een niet-affectieve prikkeldimensie ge-
relateerd aan leeftijd. Op de andere helft van de beurten werden paren gezich-
ten aangeboden waarvan de deelnemers werd gevraagd hun gelijkenis te beoor-
delen op een schaal die ging van zeer verschillend tot zeer gelijkend. Deze 
gelijkenisoordelen zijn “psychologische” afstanden die werden gebruikt voor het 
creëren van een mentale, multidimensionale kaart waarin de gezichten gerepre-
senteerd worden. De oplossing die zo bekomen werd met INDSCAL bleek inder-
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daad gevoelig aan een manipulatie van kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing. 
De prikkeldimensies waartoe selectieve aandacht aangemoedigd werd, werden 
uitgerokken in de multidimensionale ruimte. In toekomstige studies zou deze 
methode toegepast kunnen worden als manipulatiecheck. 
DISCUSSIE 
In het project werden verschillende predicties getoetst die volgden uit de 
hypothese dat automatische affectieve prikkelverwerking slechts plaatsvindt 
wanneer selectief aandacht wordt besteed aan affectieve prikkelinformatie 
(Spruyt et al., 2007, 2009, 2012). De huidige studies toonden aan dat subtiele 
aspecten in de omgeving kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing kunnen sturen, 
en dat de effecten van kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing op automatische 
affectieve prikkelverwerking zich ook uitbreiden naar de gevolgen van automati-
sche affectieve prikkelverwerking. Verder werd een methode gevalideerd die het 
in de toekomst mogelijk maakt om kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing op 
een onafhankelijke wijze te meten. Een dergelijke methode kan in toekomstige 
studies gebruikt worden als manipulatiecheck. 
Het denkkader van kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing heeft ook en-
kele gevolgen voor onderzoek en diens praktische toepassingen. Volgens het 
denkkader van kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing wordt de verwerking van 
elke prikkeldimensie gefaciliteerd als er aandacht aan geschonken wordt, onge-
acht of de prikkeldimensie affectief is of niet. Elke fenomeen dat gekenmerkt 
wordt door de verwerking van prikkels of prikkelkenmerken is dus tot op een 
zekere hoogte afhankelijk van kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing. Zo speelt 
kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing naar alle waarschijnlijkheid een rol in de 
activatie van attitudes, stereotypes, en automatische associaties. Voor het ge-
bruik van deze constructen in praktische toepassingen, zoals het voorspellen van 
gedrag op basis van attitudes, dient men bijgevolg rekening te houden met ken-
merkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing. Het denkkader heeft ook enkele klinische 
implicaties. Zo kan kenmerkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing een grote rol spelen 
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in fobieën en angststoornissen. Populaties met dergelijke stoornissen schenken 
intensief aandacht aan affectieve- of stoornisrelevante prikkelinformatie. Een 
dergelijke aandachtsbias speelt mogelijks een cruciale rol in deze psychopatholo-
gische vormen (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Het veranderen van deze aandachtsbias 
zou bijgevolg een gunstig effect kunnen hebben op de geassocieerde stoornis. In 
toekomstig onderzoek zou men kunnen nagaan of het trainen tot het schenken 
van aandacht aan niet-affectieve prikkelinformatie gunstige effecten kan hebben 
voor populaties met fobieën en angststoornissen. Verder onderzoek naar ken-
merkspecifieke aandachtstoewijzing zou dus onze kennis over fenomenen zoals 
attitudes en angststoornissen kunnen verbeteren. 
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